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Abstract
This paper extends Samuelson’s theory of optimal government purchases by consider-
ing the contribution of government purchases to macroeconomic stabilization. We consider
a matching model in which unemployment can be too high or too low. We derive a sufficient-
statistics formula for optimal government purchases. Our formula is the Samuelson formula
plus a correction term proportional to the government-purchases multiplier and the gap be-
tween actual and efficient unemployment rate. Optimal government purchases are above the
Samuelson level when the correction term is positive—for instance, when the multiplier is
positive and unemployment is inefficiently high. Our formula indicates that US government
purchases, which are mildly countercyclical, are optimal under a small multiplier of 0.03. If
the multiplier is larger, US government purchases are not countercyclical enough. Our for-
mula implies significant increases in government purchases during slumps. For instance, with
a multiplier of 0.5 and other statistics calibrated to the US economy, when the unemployment
rate rises from the US average of 5.9% to 9%, the optimal government purchases-output ra-
tio increases from 16.6% to 19.8%. However, the optimal ratio increases less for multipliers
above 0.5 because with higher multipliers, the unemployment gap can be filled with fewer
government purchases. For instance, with a multiplier of 2, the optimal ratio only increases
from 16.6% to 17.6%.
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1. Introduction
In the United States, the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 imparts the responsi-
bility of achieving full employment to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, through the
choice of the Federal funds rate, and to the government, through public employment and other pub-
lic expenditure. In practice however it is the Federal Reserve that has been in charge of macroeco-
nomic stabilization. This reliance on monetary policy reflects the consensus among policymakers
and academic researchers that monetary policy is more adapted to stabilize the economy.
But the stabilization achieved through monetary policy alone remains imperfect. Of course, at
the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, monetary policy is severely constrained, and that
is what happens starting in 2009.1 But that is not all; as Figure 1 shows, much of the increase in
unemployment had occurred before reaching the zero lower bound, as nominal interest rates were
falling. Even in the 1991 and 2001 recessions, when monetary policy was not subject to the zero
lower bound, stabilization was only partial. Thus, the unemployment rate has fluctuated noticeably
over the past thirty years despite strong responses of the Federal funds rate.
This paper explores how government purchases can be used to improve macroeconomic stabi-
lization. To that end, we embed the standard theory of optimal government purchases, developed
by Samuelson [1954], within a matching model of the macroeconomy.2 Samuelson’s theory ap-
plies to a competitive model, which is efficient. In that setting, the optimal provision of government
consumption is given by a simple formula: the marginal rate of substitution between government
consumption and personal consumption equals the marginal rate of transformation between gov-
ernment consumption and personal consumption, which is one in our model.
But a matching model is not necessarily efficient. Our model builds on the matching frame-
work from Michaillat and Saez [2015]. There is one matching market where households sell labor
services to other households and the government. In equilibrium there is some unemployment:
sellers are unable to sell all the labor services that they could have produced. The unemployment
rate may not be efficient: when unemployment is inefficiently low, too many resources are devoted
1Krugman [1998] and Eggertsson and Woodford [2003] describe how the effectiveness of monetary policy is
restricted by the existence of a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
2In a related manner, the new dynamic public finance literature connects normative public economics to macroe-
conomic models, although it focuses mostly on taxation, not on government purchases.
2
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 0%
 2%
 4%
 6%
 8%
10%
Federal funds rate
Unemployment rate
Figure 1: Unemployment and Monetary Policy in the United States, 1985–2014
Notes: The unemployment rate is the quarterly average of the seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment rate con-
structed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The federal funds rate
is the quarterly average of the daily effective federal funds rate set by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. The shaded areas represent the recessions identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
to recruiting workers, and a further reduction in unemployment would reduce welfare; when unem-
ployment is inefficiently high, too few jobseekers find a job, too much of the productive capacity of
the economy is idle, and a reduction in unemployment would raise welfare. When unemployment
is inefficiently high, or inefficiently low, and when government purchases influence unemploy-
ment, government purchases have an additional effect on welfare, unaccounted for in Samuelson’s
theory. Hence, our formula for optimal government purchases is the Samuelson formula plus a cor-
rection term that measures the effect of government purchases on welfare through their influence
on unemployment.3
We express our formula for optimal government purchases in terms of estimable sufficient
statistics [Chetty, 2009].4 By virtue of being expressed with sufficient statistics, the formula ap-
plies to a broad range of matching models. The formula is indeed valid for any utility function, any
matching function with constant returns to scale, any aggregate demand function, any mechanism
for the price of services, and various ways to finance government purchases—lump-sum taxes,
certain distortionary taxes, or deficit spending.
Two central sufficient statistics in our formula are the government-purchases multiplier and the
3A small literature also analyzes optimal government purchases in disequilibrium models. See for instance Roberts
[1982] and Dre`ze [1985]. Since our model of unemployment is simpler and richer than the disequilibrium model (see
the discussion in Michaillat and Saez [2015]), our analysis is more transparent and provides new insights.
4The new dynamic public finance literature has also recently strived to express optimal policy formulas in terms of
estimable statistics [Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2015].
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gap between actual and efficient unemployment rate because the correction term is proportional to
the product of these two statistics. The gap between actual unemployment and efficient unemploy-
ment determines the effect of unemployment on welfare, and the government-purchases multiplier
determines the effect of government purchases on unemployment. Hence, our formula connects
the effect of government purchases on welfare to the estimates of government-purchase multipliers
obtained by a voluminous literature.5 This literature empirically estimates or numerically com-
putes multipliers to describe the effects of government purchases on output and other variables,
abstracting from welfare considerations. However, the multiplier plays a large role in actual policy
discussions about stimulus. Stimulus advocates believe that multipliers are substantial and hence
that government purchases can help fill the output gap in recessions [for example, Romer and Bern-
stein, 2009]. Conversely, stimulus skeptics believe that multipliers are small or negative and warn
that additional government spending could be wasteful [for example, Barro and Redlick, 2011].
Our theory contributes to this debate by showing how optimal government purchases in recessions
depend on both the multiplier and the social value of such purchases.
The relationship between the optimal level of government purchases and the Samuelson level
is conditioned by the correction term. When the unemployment rate is efficient or the multiplier is
zero, the correction term is zero and optimal government purchases follow the Samuelson formula.
But when the unemployment rate is inefficient and the multiplier is nonzero, optimal government
purchases systematically depart from the Samuelson formula. Optimal government purchases are
above the Samuelson level when the correction term is positive and below it when the correction
term is negative. When the multiplier is positive, the correction term is positive when unemploy-
ment is inefficiently high and negative when unemployment is inefficiently low.
The structure of our formula—the Samuelson formula plus a correction term capturing stabi-
lization motives—provides results that are similar in nature to those obtained by others in new
Keynesian models. Woodford [2011] notes that away from the zero lower bound, monetary policy
perfectly stabilizes the economy; hence, there is no need to use government expenditure for sta-
bilization, and government purchases should follow the Samuelson formula. We obtain the same
5In the literature estimating multipliers on US data, a few representative studies include Rotemberg and Woodford
[1992], Ramey and Shapiro [1998], Blanchard and Perotti [2002], Galı´, Lopez-Salido and Valles [2007], Mountford
and Uhlig [2009], Hall [2009], Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012], Barro and Redlick [2011], Ramey [2011b], and
Nakamura and Steinsson [2014]. See Ramey [2011a] for an excellent survey.
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result when unemployment is efficient in our model. Werning [2012] describes the optimal use of
government purchases in a liquidity trap, and decomposes the optimal level of government pur-
chases as the Samuelson level plus a correction term arising when government purchases stimulate
the economy. Galı´ and Monacelli [2008] and Farhi and Werning [2012] study the optimal use gov-
ernment purchases for stabilization in multicountry unions. They find that government purchases
should be provided beyond the Samuelson level when government purchases are stabilizing.
Since our formula is expressed with statistics that can be estimated in US data, it is easy to use
the formula to address several policy questions. First, we evaluate the response of US government
purchases to unemployment fluctuations. We find that actual US government purchases, which are
mildly counter-cyclical, would be optimal under a minuscule multiplier of 0.03. If the multiplier
is larger than 0.03, US government purchases are not countercyclical enough.
Second, we determine the optimal response of government purchases to a given increase in
unemployment. We find that with a multiplier of 0.5, the optimal government purchases-output
ratio increases from 16.6% to 19.8% when the unemployment rate rises from 5.9% to 9%. How-
ever, this ratio increases less for multipliers above 0.5. The optimal government purchases-output
ratio increases only from 16.6% to 17.6% for a multiplier of 2. The optimal ratio also increases
from 16.6% to 17.6% for a small multiplier of 0.08. Hence, our theory suggests that govern-
ment purchases should be markedly countercyclical for any positive multiplier, even a small one.
The intuition for the hump-shaped relation between the multiplier and the optimal increase of the
government purchases-output ratio is the following. For small multipliers, the optimal amount of
government purchases is determined by the crowding out of personal consumption by government
consumption; a higher multiplier means less crowding out and thus higher optimal government
purchases. For large multipliers, it is optimal to fill the unemployment gap and a higher multiplier
means that fewer government purchases are required to fill this gap.
2. A Generic Model of Unemployment with Government Purchases
This section proposes a dynamic model of unemployment with government purchases. The model
is set in continuous time. The model is generic in that we do not place much structure on the
utility function, matching function, aggregate demand, price mechanism, and tax system. The
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components of the model that we introduce are sufficient to define a feasible allocation and describe
the mathematical structure of an equilibrium, which are the only elements on which the optimal
policy analysis relies. By maintaining this degree of generality, we will be able to show in Section 3
that our sufficient-statistics formula for optimal government purchases applies to a broad range of
models. In Section 6, we will provide a specific model as an example.
The model builds on the matching framework from Michaillat and Saez [2015]. The economy
is composed of a measure 1 of identical households. Households are self-employed, producing and
selling services on a market with matching frictions.6 Services are purchased by the government
and by other households.7
A household has a productive capacity normalized to 1. The productive capacity indicates
the maximum amount of services that a household could deliver at any point in time. At time t,
a household sells Y (t) < 1 units of services. An amount C(t) of these services are purchased by
other households and an amount G(t) is purchased by the government such that Y (t) =C(t)+G(t).
The services are sold through long-term relationships that separate at rate s > 0. The idle capacity
of the household at time t is 1−Y (t). Since some of the capacity of the household is idle, some
household members are unemployed. The rate of unemployment, defined as the share of workers
who are idle, is u(t) = 1−Y (t), where Y (t) is the aggregate output of services.
To purchase labor services at time t, households and government advertise v(t) vacancies. New
long-term relationships are formed at a rate h(1−Y (t),v(t)), where h is the matching function,
1−Y (t) is the aggregate idle capacity, and v(t) is the aggregate number of vacancies. The matching
function is continuously differentiable, is increasing in both its arguments, is concave, and has
constant returns to scale. We also impose that h(0,v) = 0 and h(1−Y,0) = 0.
The market tightness x is defined by x(t) = v(t)/(1−Y (t)). The market tightness is the ratio of
the two arguments in the matching function: aggregate vacancies and aggregate idle capacity. Since
it is an aggregate variable, households take the market tightness as given. With constant returns to
scale in matching, the market tightness determines the rates at which sellers and buyers enter into
new long-term trading relationships. At time t, each of the 1−Y (t) units of available productive
6To simplify the analysis, we abstract from firms and assume that all production directly takes place within house-
holds. Michaillat and Saez [2015] show how the model can be extended to include a labor market and a product market
and firms hiring workers on the labor market and selling their production on the product market.
7We assume that households cannot consume their own labor services.
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capacity is committed to a long-term relationship at rate f (x(t)) = h(1−Y (t),v(t))/(1−Y (t)) =
h(1,x(t)) and each of the v(t) vacancy is filled with a long-term relationship at rate q(x(t)) =
h(1−Y (t),v(t))/v(t) = h(1/x(t),1). The function f is increasing and concave. The function q is
decreasing. Hence, when the market tightness is higher, it is easier to sell services but harder to
buy them. Other useful properties are that f (0) = 0, limx→+∞ q(x) = 0, and q(x) = f (x)/x. We
denote the elasticities of f (x) and q(x) with respect to x by 1−η ∈ (0,1) and −η ∈ (−1,0).
According to the matching process, output Y (t) and the unemployment rate u(t) = 1−Y (t) are
state variables. However, in practice, because the transitional dynamics of these variables are fast,
output and unemployment rate rapidly adjust to their steady-state levels.8 Throughout the paper,
we therefore simplify the analysis by modeling output and unemployment rate as jump variables
equal to their steady-state values. With this simplification, output and unemployment rate become
functions of market tightness defined by
Y (x) =
f (x)
f (x)+ s
, u(x) =
s
s+ f (x)
. (1)
Appendix A derives these expressions. Appendix B shows that transitional dynamics are quantita-
tively unimportant. The function Y (x) is in [0,1], increasing on [0,+∞), with Y (0) = 0. Intuitively,
when the market tightness is higher, if it easier to sell services so output is higher. The elasticity
of Y (x) is (1−η) ·u(x).
Advertising vacancies is costly. Posting one vacancy costs ρ > 0 services per unit time.9
Hence, a total of ρ · v(t) services are spent at time t on filling vacancies. These services repre-
sent the resources devoted by households and government to matching with appropriate providers
of services. Since these resources devoted to matching do not enter households’ utility function,
we define two concepts of consumption. We refer to the quantities C(t) and G(t) purchased by
households and government as gross personal consumption and gross government consumption.
Following common usage, government consumption designates the consumption by households
of services purchased by the government. We define the gross consumptions net of consump-
tion of matching services as net personal consumption c(t) <C(t) and net government consump-
tion g(t) < G(t). As C(t) and G(t) are fast-moving state variables that are well approximated by
8Hall [2005], Pissarides [2009], and Shimer [2012] make this point.
9Expressing vacancy costs directly in terms of labor services simplifies the model [Michaillat and Saez, 2015].
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their steady-state levels, net and gross consumptions are related by C(t) = [1+ τ(x(t))] · c(t) and
G(t) = [1+ τ(x(t))] ·g(t), where
τ(x) =
ρ · s
q(x)−ρ · s . (2)
We also refer to the quantity Y (t)=C(t)+G(t) as gross output and the quantity y(t)= c(t)+g(t) as
net output. Of course, Y (t) = [1+ τ(x(t))] · y(t). All these expressions are derived in Appendix A.
The concepts of gross consumption and gross output correspond to the quantities measured in
national accounts.10 In our model, gross output is proportional to employment. Part of employment
is used to create matches (for instance, human resource workers, procurement workers, buyers).
This share of employment is part of total employment measured in national accounts, even though
the services they provide are used for matching and do not enter households’ utility.
Because of the matching cost, enjoying one service requires to purchase 1+ τ services—one
service that enters the utility function plus τ services for matching. From the buyer’s perspective, it
is as if it purchased 1 service at a unit price 1+τ , so τ acts as a wedge on the price of services. The
wedge τ(x) is positive and increasing on [0,xm), where xm ∈ (0,+∞) is defined by q(xm) = ρ · s.11
In addition, limx→xm τ(x) =+∞. Intuitively, when the market tightness is higher, it is more difficult
to match with a seller so the matching wedge is higher. The elasticity of 1+ τ(x) is η · τ(x).
It is useful to write net output as a function of market tightness:
y(x) =
Y (x)
1+ τ(x)
. (3)
This function y(x) plays a central role in the analysis because it gives the amount of services that
can be allocated between net personal consumption and net government consumption for a given
tightness. The function y(x) is defined on [0,xm], positive, with y(0) = 0 and y(xm) = 0. The
elasticity of y(x) is (1−η) ·u(x)−η · τ(x).
We assume that the matching function is well behaved such that the function y(x) is concave.12
10In the US National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), C(t) is “personal consumption expenditures” and G(t)
“government consumption expenditures”.
11We assume that q(0)> ρ · s such that xm > 0 is well defined. Since limx→+∞ q(x) = 0, xm is necessarily finite.
12In Section 6, we use a standard Cobb-Douglas matching function and show that y(x) is indeed concave.
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Figure 2: The Market for Labor Services
Hence, there is a unique tightness x∗ ∈ (0,xm) that maximizes y(x). The tightness x∗ satisfies
1 =
η
1−η ·
τ(x∗)
u(x∗)
. (4)
The tightness x∗ is the efficient tightness. We denote the efficient unemployment rate by u∗= u(x∗).
Figure 2 summarizes the results that we have established. Panel A depicts how net output,
gross output, and unemployment rate depend on market tightness. Panel B depicts the function
y(x), the efficient tightness x∗, the efficient unemployment rate u∗, and situations in which the
unemployment rate is inefficiently high (u > u∗) and inefficiently low (u < u∗).
We assume that the government sets g(t) as a function of the other variables at time t and
parameters.13 In that case, the dynamical system describing the equilibrium of the model only
has jump variables—no state variables. We therefore assume that the equilibrium system is a
source. Accordingly, the equilibrium converges immediately to its steady-state value from any
initial condition.14
We summarize the presentation of the model by defining an allocation and an equilibrium. We
give a static definition since we assume that the system converges immediately to its steady-state:
DEFINITION 1. A feasible allocation is a net personal consumption c ∈ [0,1], a net government
13This means that g(t) does not have any persistence.
14Without this assumption, the model would suffer from dynamic indeterminacy, making the welfare analysis im-
possible.
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consumption, g ∈ [0,1], and net output y ∈ [0,1], and a market tightness x ∈ [0,+∞) that satisfy
y = y(x) and c = y−g. The function y(x) is defined by (3).
DEFINITION 2. An equilibrium function is a mapping that associates a feasible allocation [c,g,y,x]
to a net government consumption g. Given that in a feasible allocation, y and c are functions of
x and g, the equilibrium function can be summarized by a mapping g 7→ x(g) that associates a
market tightness to a net government consumption. We assume that the equilibrium function x(g)
is continuously differentiable.
In the model, an equilibrium is just a value of the equilibrium function. In practice the equilib-
rium function x(g) arises from the household’s optimal consumption choice, the price mechanism,
and the tax system in place to finance government purchases. The function x(g) can describe ef-
ficient prices, bargained prices, or rigid prices. It can describe economies in which government
purchases are financed by lump-sum taxes or taxes proportional to output or consumption, by
deficit spending with Ricardian households, or by deficit spending with non-Ricardian households.
As a concrete example, we will describe the function x(g) in the specific model of Section 6.
3. Sufficient-Statistics Formulas for Optimal Government Purchases
The representative household derives instantaneous utility U (c,g) from net personal consump-
tion c and net government consumption g. The function U is twice continuously differentiable,
increasing in its two arguments, concave, and homothetic.15 Since U is homothetic, the marginal
rate of substitution between g and c is a decreasing function of g/c = G/C.16
Since the equilibrium immediately converges to its steady state, the welfare in an equilibrium
is just U (c,g). In a feasible allocation, net personal consumption is given by c = y(x)− g, so
welfare can be written as U (y(x)−g,g). Given an equilibrium function x(g), the problem of the
15By homothetic, we mean that the utility can be written as U (c,g) = w(p(c,g))) where the function w is twice
continuously differentiable and increasing and the function p is twice continuously differentiable, increasing in its two
arguments, concave, and homogeneous of degree 1.
16The marginal rate of substitution between g and c is MRSgc = (∂U /∂g)/(∂U /∂c) = pg(c,g)/pc(c,g). Since p
is homogeneous of degree 1, the derivatives pc and pg are homogeneous of degree 0. Hence, we can write MRSgc =
pg(1,g/c)/pc(c/g,1). Thus, MRSgc is a function of g/c only. Since p is concave, pg(1,g/c) is a decreasing function
of g/c and pc(c/g,1) is an increasing function of g/c. Hence, MRSgc is a decreasing function of g/c.
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government is to determine g to maximize welfare
W (g) =U (y(x(g))−g,g).
We assume that the government’s problem is a well-behaved concave problem such that the first-
order conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize the optimum.
In this section we derive several sufficient-statistics formulas giving the optimal level of govern-
ment purchases. These formulas are equivalent, but they are adapted to answer different questions.
We start by expressing the formula in an abstract way to describe the economic forces at play and
compare the optimal level of government purchases to the level from the Samuelson formula.
Next, we express the abstract formula in terms of sufficient statistics that can be estimated in
the data. This exact formula can be calibrated empirically but it is somewhat complex. Hence, we
approximate it with an extremely simple formula that relates the deviation of optimal government
purchases from the Samuelson level to the deviation of the actual market tightness from the efficient
market tightness and only two statistics: the elasticity of substitution between government and
personal consumption, and the government-purchases multiplier.
The simple formula is helpful to evaluate actual government purchases, but because it only de-
fines optimal government purchases implicitly, it cannot answer some practical questions such as:
How much government purchases should increase if we observed some increase in the unemploy-
ment rate? To answer this question, we rework the simple implicit formula and derive a formula
that explicitly express optimal government purchases as a function of stable sufficient statistics and
the initial observed increase in unemployment.
3.1. An Abstract Formula
Taking the first-order condition of the government’s problem, we obtain
0 =
dW
dg
=−∂U
∂c
+
∂U
∂g
+
∂U
∂c
· dy
dx
· dx
dg
.
Reshuffling the terms in the optimality condition and dividing the condition by ∂U /∂c yields the
formula for optimal government purchases:
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Table 1: Optimal Government Purchases-Output Ratio Compared to Samuelson Ratio
Effect of net government consumption on unemployment
Unemployment rate du/dg > 0 du/dg = 0 du/dg < 0
Inefficiently high lower same higher
Efficient same same same
Inefficiently low higher same lower
Notes: The government purchases-output ratio in the theory of Samuelson [1954] is given by 1=MRSgc. Compared to
the Samuelson ratio, the optimal government purchases-output ratio is higher if the correction term in (5) is positive,
same if the correction term is zero, and lower if the correction term is negative. By definition, the unemployment
rate is inefficiently high when dy/dx > 0, inefficiently low when dy/dx < 0, and efficient when dy/dx = 0. Last,
du/dg = (du/dx) · (dx/dg) where u(x) is given by (1). Since du/dx > 0, the signs of du/dg and dx/dg are the same.
PROPOSITION 1. Optimal government purchases satisfy
1 = MRSgc+
dy
dx
· dx
dg
, (5)
where MRSgc = (∂U /∂g)/(∂U /∂c) is the marginal rate of substitution between government
consumption and personal consumption.
The Samuelson formula is 1 = MRSgc; it requires that the marginal utility from personal
consumption equals the marginal utility from government consumption. Our formula is just the
Samuelson formula plus a correction term equal to (dy/dx)·(dx/dg). The structure of the formula—
a standard public-economics formula plus a correction term capturing stabilization motives—is
similar to the structure of the formula for optimal unemployment insurance derived by Landais,
Michaillat and Saez [2010] or for optimal taxation derived by Farhi and Werning [2013].
Since MRSgc is decreasing in g/c and G/Y = (g/c)/(g/c+ 1), MRSgc is decreasing in G/Y .
Thus, the Samuelson determines a unique government purchases-output ratio. Furthermore, our
formula indicates that it is desirable to increase the government purchases-output ratio above the
Samuelson ratio if the correction term is positive, and to decrease the government purchases-output
ratio below the Samuelson ratio if the correction term is negative. If the correction term is zero,
the optimal government purchases-output ratio satisfies the Samuelson formula.
The correction term is the product of the effect of government purchases on tightness and the
effect of tightness on net output. The correction term is positive if and only if more government
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purchases yield higher net output in equilibrium. Given the existing links between tightness, net
output, and unemployment rate (Figure 2), an equivalent statement is that the correction term is
positive if and only if government purchases bring the unemployment rate toward its efficient level.
There are two situations when the correction term is zero and the optimal government purchases-
output ratio is given by the Samuelson formula. The first situation is when dy/dx= 0, which means
that the unemployment rate is efficient. In that case, the marginal effect of government purchases
on unemployment has no first-order effect on welfare and the principles of Samuelson’s theory
apply. The second situation is when dx/dg = 0, which means that government purchases have no
effect on tightness and thus on the unemployment rate. In that case, the model is isomorphic to
Samuelson’s framework.
In all other situations, the correction term is nonzero and the optimal government purchases-
output ratio departs from the Samuelson ratio. The formula implies that the optimal government
purchases-output ratio is above the Samuelson ratio if and only if government purchases bring
unemployment closer to its efficient level. This occurs either if the unemployment rate is ineffi-
ciently high and government purchases lower it, or if the unemployment rate is inefficiently low
and government purchases raise it. Table 1 summarizes all the possibilities.
The results on government purchases typically obtained in the Keynesian regime of disequilib-
rium models can easily be recovered from formula (5).17 The correction term in (5) can be written
as (dy/dx) ·(dx/dg) = dy/dg. In a disequilibrium model, there are no matching costs so y=Y and
g=G and the correction term is the standard multiplier dY/dG. In the Keynesian regime, personal
consumption is fixed because it is determined by aggregate demand and the above-market-clearing
price; hence, there is no crowding out of personal consumption by government consumption and
dY/dG = 1. On the other hand when the product market clears, crowding out is one-for-one and
dY/dG = 0. We assume that there is some value for government purchases such that MRSgc > 0.
Our formula implies that in the Keynesian regime, it is optimal to use government purchases to fill
the output gap. Indeed, MRS+ dY/dG > 1 as long as the output gap is not closed, so additional
government purchases always raise welfare in the Keynesian regime.
17For a typical disequilibrium model, see Barro and Grossman [1971].
13
3.2. An Exact Implicit Formula
We express formula (5) with estimable sufficient statistics to facilitate its interpretation and empir-
ical applications. The correction term in (5) is (dy/dx) · (dx/dg) = dy/dg. The multiplier dy/dg
gives the increase in net output when net government consumption increases by one unit. How-
ever, dy/dg is not directly estimable in aggregate data because the data measure gross and not net
consumption. We therefore express dy/dg as a function of the multiplier dY/dG, which gives the
increase in gross output when gross government consumption increases by one unit, and other es-
timable statistics. The multiplier dY/dG corresponds to the government-purchases multiplier that
macroeconomists estimate in aggregate data. We find that (5) can be reformulated as follows:
PROPOSITION 2. Optimal government purchases satisfy
1 = MRSgc+
(
1− η
1−η ·
τ
u
)
· dY
dG
·
(
1− η
1−η ·
τ
u
· G
Y
· dY
dG
)−1
, (6)
where MRSgc is the marginal rate of substitution between government and personal consumptions,
dY/dG is the government-purchases multiplier, 1−η is the tightness elasticity of the job-finding
rate, τ is the matching wedge, u is the unemployment rate, and G/Y is the government purchases-
output ratio.
Proof. First, note that
d ln(y)
d ln(g)
=
d ln(y)
d ln(x)
· d ln(x)
d ln(G)
· d ln(G)
d ln(g)
.
Next, as the elasticity of Y (x) is (1−η) ·u, we find that
d ln(x)
d ln(G)
=
1
(1−η) ·u ·
d ln(Y )
d ln(G)
.
Last, using G = (1+ τ(x)) ·g and as the elasticity of 1+ τ(x) is η · τ , we find that
d ln(G)
d ln(g)
= 1+η · τ · d ln(x)
d ln(G)
· d ln(G)
d ln(g)
.
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Combining this equation with the expression for d ln(x)/d ln(G) obtained above, we get
d ln(G)
d ln(g)
=
(
1− η
1−η ·
τ
u
· d ln(Y )
d ln(G)
)−1
.
Combining all these results and as the elasticity of y(x) is (1−η) ·u−η · τ , we obtain
dy
dg
=
(
1− η
1−η ·
τ
u
)
· dY
dG
·
(
1− η
1−η ·
τ
u
· d ln(Y )
d ln(G)
)−1
.
Bringing all the elements together, we obtain (6).
The correction term in formula (6) is the product of three terms. The first term is d ln(y)/d ln(Y ).
It indicates how net output responds when gross output changes because of an underlying change
in tightness. This term is positive when tightness is inefficiently low and zero when tightness is
efficient. The second term is the government-purchases multiplier dY/dG. It indicates how gross
output responds to a change in gross government purchases. The last term is d ln(G)/d ln(g). It in-
dicates how gross government consumption responds when net government consumption changes.
3.3. Two Approximate Implicit Formulas
Formula (6) is a bit complex, but it can be greatly simplified with a few approximations:
PROPOSITION 3. Let x∗ and u∗ be the efficient market tightness and unemployment rate. Let
(G/C)∗ be the solution to the Samuelson formula, 1 = MRSgc. Let (G/Y )∗ = (G/C)∗/(1 +
(G/C)∗). In the vicinity of x∗ and (G/C)∗, optimal government purchases approximately satisfy
G/C− (G/C)∗
(G/C)∗
≈−ε · dY
dG
· x− x
∗
x∗
, (7)
where dY/dG is the government-purchases multiplier, and ε is the elasticity of substitution between
government and personal consumptions. Alternatively, in the vicinity of u∗ and (G/Y )∗, optimal
government purchases approximately satisfy
G/Y − (G/Y )∗
(G/Y )∗
≈ ε · dY
dG
· 1− (G/Y )
∗
1−η ·
u−u∗
u∗
, (8)
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where 1−η is the tightness elasticity of the job-finding rate. The statistics ε , dY/dG, and 1−η
can be estimated around x∗ and (G/C)∗.
Proof. We start from formula (6). The first approximation is a simple first-order approxima-
tion of MRSgc around (G/C)∗. Since we assume homothetic preferences, MRSgc is a function
of g/c = G/C only. By definition of the elasticity of substitution between g and c, −1/ε =
d ln(MRSgc)/d ln(G/C). The first-order approximation of ln(MRSgc) around ln((G/C)∗) yields
ln
(
MRSgc
(
G
C
))
− ln
(
MRSgc
((
G
C
)∗))
=−1
ε
·
[
ln
(
G
C
)
− ln
((
G
C
)∗)]
.
By definition, MRSgc ((G/C)∗) = 1 so ln(MRSgc ((G/C)∗)) = 0. Furthermore, for G/C around
(G/C)∗, ln((G/C)/(G/C)∗)≈ (G/C)/(G/C)∗−1 and MRSgc (G/C)≈ 1 so ln(MRSgc (G/C))≈
MRSgc (G/C)−1. Combining these first-order approximations, we obtain
MRSgc−1≈−1ε ·
G/C− (G/C)∗
(G/C)∗
.
Note that the elasticity of substitution, ε , is evaluated at (G/C)∗.
The second approximation is that
τ(x)
u(x)
=
s ·ρ
q(x)− s ·ρ ·
s+ f (x)
s
≈ s ·ρ
q(x)
· f (x)
s
= ρ · x.
On average in US monthly data, s = 3.3%, s ·ρ = 6.5%, f (x) = 56%, and q(x) = 94%, which is
why we can approximate s+ f (x) by f (x) and q(x)− s ·ρ by q(x).18 This approximation implies
that τ(x∗)/u(x∗)≈ ρ ·x∗. We also know that by definition of efficiency, τ(x∗)/u(x∗) = (1−η)/η .
Hence, (1−η)/η ≈ ρ · x∗. Combining these approximations, we obtain
1− η
1−η ·
τ(x)
u(x)
≈ 1− x
x∗
. (9)
This term is small around x∗, so up to a first-order approximation, all the other terms in the correc-
tion term of formula (6) can be evaluated at x∗. This includes the multiplier, dY/dG.
18Using US data, Appendix B obtains the average value of s, s ·ρ , f (x), and q(x). Appendix B also validates the
approximation at any point in time between 1951 and 2014.
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The third approximation is that
1− η
1−η ·
τ(x)
u(x)
· G
Y
· dY
dG
≈ 1− x
x∗
· d ln(Y )
d ln(G)
≈ 1− d ln(Y )
d ln(G)
.
The first step in this approximation comes from (9). The second step is possible because we
evaluate this expression at x∗, as we have just discussed.
Combining the three approximations yields
G/C− (G/C)∗
(G/C)∗
≈−ε · dY/dG
1−d ln(Y )/d ln(G) ·
x− x∗
x∗
. (10)
For large values of the elasticity d ln(Y )/d ln(G), which means large values of the multiplier
dY/dG combined with large values of the ratio G/Y , we could not simplify the formula fur-
ther. However, in practice, the elasticity d ln(Y )/d ln(G) is fairly small. On average in US
data, G/Y = 0.17 and a reasonable estimate of the multiplier is dY/dG = 0.5. With these val-
ues, 1− d ln(Y )/d ln(G) ≈ 0.92, quite close to 1. Hence, we further simplify formula (10) by
approximating the term 1−d ln(Y )/d ln(G) by 1.19 Thus, we obtain formula (7).
To obtain formula (8), we start from (7) and use first-order approximations to express the
relative deviations of u and G/Y as a function of those of x and G/C. Using u = 1−Y (x) and the
elasticity of Y (x), we find that for u and x near u∗ and x∗,
u−u∗
u∗
≈ ln
( u
u∗
)
≈ u
∗−1
u∗
· (1−η) ·u∗ · ln
( x
x∗
)
≈ (u∗−1) · (1−η) · x− x
∗
x∗
≈−(1−η) · x− x
∗
x∗
.
We obtain the last approximation by noting that in the US, u∗− 1 = −0.941 ≈ −1. Next, using
G/Y = (G/C)/(1+G/C), we find that for G/Y and G/C near (G/Y )∗ and (G/C)∗,
G/Y − (G/Y )∗
(G/Y )∗
≈ ln
(
G/Y
(G/Y )∗
)
≈ [1− (G/Y )∗] · ln
(
G/C
(G/C)∗
)
≈ [1− (G/Y )∗] · G/C− (G/C)
∗
(G/C)∗
.
19Section 4 discusses available estimates of dY/dG. Using US data, Appendix B obtains the average value of G/Y
and validates the approximation at any point in time between 1951 and 2014.
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Combining these two approximations with formula (10) yields
G/Y − (G/Y )∗
(G/Y )∗
≈ ε · dY/dG
1−d ln(Y )/d ln(G) ·
1− (G/Y )∗
1−η ·
u−u∗
u∗
. (11)
Using again that 1−d ln(Y )/d ln(G)≈ 1, we obtain formula (8).
Formulas (7) and (8) are equivalent but they are adapted to different tasks. Formula (7) is
simpler—it involves fewer statistics and fewer approximations—and it will be useful for the em-
pirical analysis. Formula (8), on the other hand, is easier to interpret and will be useful later on.
Formulas (7) and (8) highlight the two statistics required to determine the optimal level of gov-
ernment purchases: the elasticity of substitution between government and personal consumptions
and the government-purchases multiplier.
The elasticity of substitution plays an important role because it determines how rapidly the
marginal value of government purchases relative to that of personal consumption fades with ad-
ditional government purchases. The role of this elasticity has been largely neglected in previous
work. If ε = 0, for instance U (c,g) = min{(c/c),(g/g)}, then government purchases are useless
at the margin beyond g/c, so the ratio G/C should stay at g/c. This would be a situation in which
we need a number of bridges for an economy of a given size, but beyond that number, additional
bridges have zero value (“bridges to nowhere”). If ε→+∞, for instance U (c,g) = c+g, then the
marginal rate of substitution is constant at 1. In that case, government purchases should be used to
always fill the unemployment gap such that x = x∗. The intuition is that the composition of output
does not matter for welfare so government consumption should be used to stabilize the economy,
even if it crowds out private consumption, since the only thing that matters for welfare is total con-
sumption. This would be a situation in which the services provided by the government substitute
exactly the services that can be purchased by individuals on the market. In reality, government
purchases probably have some value at the margin, without being perfect substitute for personal
consumption; that is, ε > 0 but ε <+∞. We will consider a range of values for ε .
The formulas confirm an intuition that many macroeconomists had but that had not been for-
malized before: optimal government purchases do depend on the government-purchases multiplier.
Of course, if the multiplier is zero then government purchases should remain at the level given by
the Samuelson formula. If the multiplier is positive, the government purchases-output ratio should
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be above the Samuelson ratio when unemployment is inefficiently high. If multiplier is negative,
the converse applies: the government purchases-output ratio should be below the Samuelson ratio
when unemployment is inefficiently high.
However, fluctuations of the multiplier in response to a change in unemployment only have
second-order effects. It is the departures of unemployment from its efficient level that have first-
order effects on the optimal level of government purchases. To a first-order approximation, the
average multiplier is sufficient to obtain the response of optimal government purchases to a shock.
3.4. An Approximate Explicit Formula
While formula (7) is useful for certain applications, we cannot use the formula to answer the
following question: if the unemployment rate is 50% above its efficient level and government pur-
chases are at the Samuelson level, what should be the increase in government purchases? This is
because our formula is an implicit formula: it gives the relation that equilibrium statistics should
satisfy, but it does not tell us how much government purchases should change to arrive at the opti-
mum because the right-hand side of (7) is endogenous to G/Y . In fact, this is a typical limitation
of sufficient-statistics optimal policy formulas, and a typical criticism addressed to the sufficient-
statistics approach [Chetty, 2009; Golosov, Troshkin and Tsyvinski, 2011]. Here we develop an
explicit sufficient-statistics formula that we can use to address this question.
Assume that the unemployment rate is initially efficient and that an unexpected permanent
shock brings the unemployment rate from u∗ to u0. As government purchases G change, the
unemployment rate will endogenously respond. It is this endogenous response that we need to
describe to obtain our explicit formula.
PROPOSITION 4. Let u∗ be the efficient unemployment rate. Let (G/Y )∗ be the government
purchases-output ratio given by the Samuelson formula, 1 = MRSgc. Initially, the unemployment
rate is efficient (u = u∗) and the government purchases-output ratio is optimal (G/Y = (G/Y )∗).
The economy is hit by an unexpected permanent shock that brings the unemployment rate to
u0 > u∗. Then the response of the optimal government purchases-output ratio satisfies
G/Y − (G/Y )∗
(G/Y )∗
≈ ε ·
dY
dG
1−η
1−(G/Y )∗ + ε ·
( dY
dG
)2 · (G/Y )∗u∗ ·
u0−u∗
u∗
, (12)
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where dY/dG is the government-purchases multiplier, ε the elasticity of substitution between gov-
ernment and personal consumptions, and 1−η the tightness elasticity of the job-finding rate.
Proof. At u0, government purchases are G0 and Y0 such that G0/Y0 = (G/Y )∗. Then, as govern-
ment purchases change to G, the unemployment rate responds. We describe this response to obtain
the explicit formula. Given that u = 1−Y , du/dG =−(dY/dG). Hence, a first-order approxima-
tion of u around G0 yields (after subtracting u∗ on both sides)
u−u∗ ≈ u0−u∗− dYdG · (G−G0).
Moreover, first-order approximation when G and G/Y are around G0 and G0/Y0 = (G/Y )∗ gives
G/Y − (G/Y )∗
(G/Y )∗
≈ ln
(
G/Y
G0/Y0
)
≈
(
1− d ln(Y )
d ln(G)
)
· ln
(
G
G0
)
≈
(
1− d ln(Y )
d ln(G)
)
· G−G0
G0
.
Noting that G0 = (1−u0) · (G/Y )∗ ≈ (G/Y )∗ and collecting these results yields
u−u∗
u∗
=
u0−u∗
u∗
− (G/Y )
∗
u∗
· dY/dG
1−d ln(Y )/d ln(G) ·
G/Y − (G/Y )∗
(G/Y )∗
.
We plug this expression in formula (11) and do a bit of algebra to obtain
G/Y − (G/Y )∗
(G/Y )∗
≈
ε · dY/dG1−d ln(Y )/d ln(G)
1−η
1−(G/Y )∗ + ε ·
(
dY/dG
1−d ln(Y )/d ln(G)
)2 · (G/Y )∗u∗ ·
u0−u∗
u∗
. (13)
Once more, if d ln(Y )/d ln(G) were not small, we could not simplify the formula further. But since
in practice 1−d ln(Y )/d ln(G)≈ 1, we simplify the formula to obtain (12).
Formula (12) links the relative deviation of the government purchases-output ratio with the
relative deviation of the unemployment rate. The formula can be directly applied by policymakers
to determine the optimal response of government purchases to a shock that leads to an increase or
decrease in the unemployment rate.
Consider an increase in unemployment by 1 percentage point from the efficient unemployment
rate u∗. Formula (13) gives the optimal change in the government purchases-output ratio in re-
sponse to higher unemployment. We denote this optimal change, measured in percentage points,
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by ∆(dY/dG). An implication from (13) is that for positive multipliers, the function ∆ is positive
but hump-shaped—that is, a higher multiplier does not necessarily imply a stronger increase in
government purchases after an increase in unemployment. The following proposition formalizes
this statement:
PROPOSITION 5. The function ∆ is negative on (−∞,0], positive on [0,Y/G), with ∆(0)=∆(Y/G)=
0. The function ∆ is decreasing on (−∞,(dY/dG)min], increasing on [(dY/dG)min,(dY/dG)max],
and decreasing on [(dY/dG)max,Y/G]. The function ∆ is minimized at maximized at (dY/dG)min <
0 and maximized at (dY/dG)max > 0. Let ∆m be the maximum of ∆. The minimum of ∆ is −∆m.
The extremum ∆m is given by
∆m =
√
ε · 1− (G/Y )
∗
1−η ·
(G/Y )∗
u∗
.
Proof. The function ∆ is defined by
∆(dY/dG) =
dY/dG
1−d ln(Y )/d ln(G)
1
ε · 1−η1−(G/Y )∗ · u
∗
(G/Y )∗ +
(
dY/dG
1−d ln(Y )/d ln(G)
)2
All the results follow from some routine algebra. (It is useful to make the change of variable
θ = (dY/dG)/(1−d ln(Y )/d ln(G)).)
The maximum ∆m gives the strongest possible response of government purchases to an increase
in unemployment, for any possible multiplier. This upper bound is useful given that empirical
research has not yet reached a consensus on the precise value of the multiplier. The maximum
depends critically on the elasticity of substitution.
There is a simple intuition behind the apparently surprising result that the increase in govern-
ment purchases is not monotonically increasing with the multiplier. Consider first a small multi-
plier: dY/dG→ 0. We can neglect the feedback effect of G on u because the multiplier is small so
u≈ u0. Hence, the application of formula (8) yields
G/Y − (G/Y )∗
(G/Y )∗
≈ ε · dY
dG
· 1− (G/Y )
∗
1−η ·
u0−u∗
u∗
.
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From this formula, it is clear that when dY/dG→ 0, G/Y − (G/Y )∗ increases with dY/dG.20 The
intuition is that for small multipliers, the optimal amount of government purchases is determined
by the crowding out of personal consumption by government consumption; a higher multiplier
means less crowding out and thus higher optimal government purchases.
Consider next a very large multiplier, d ln(Y )/d ln(G)→ 1. With such a large multiplier, G/Y
remains constant as G increases (formally, d ln(G/Y )/d ln(G) = 1−d ln(Y )/d ln(G)→ 0). Since
the marginal rate of substitution between government and personal consumptions only depends
on G/Y , increasing G fills the output gap without changing the marginal rate of substitution.
The optimum is to fill the output gap Y ∗ −Y0 by increasing G while maintaining G/Y at the
Samuelson level with MRSgc = 1. A first-order approximation yields (Y −Y0)/Y0 ≈ ln(Y/Y0) ≈
(d ln(Y )/d ln(G)) · ln(G/G0). When the output gap is filled, (Y −Y0)/Y0 = (Y ∗−Y0)/Y0 ≈ u0−u∗.
Hence, filling the output gap necessitates ln(G/G0) = (u0−u∗)/(d ln(Y )/d ln(G)). Furthermore,
another first-order approximation implies that [G/Y − (G/Y )∗]/(G/Y )∗ ≈ ln((G/Y )/(G/Y )∗) =
ln((G/Y )/(G0/Y0))≈ (1−d ln(Y )/d ln(G)) · ln(G/G0). Hence we obtain the formula
G/Y − (G/Y )∗
(G/Y )∗
≈ 1−d ln(Y )/d ln(G)
d ln(Y )/d ln(G)
· (u0−u∗)
Clearly, G/Y − (G/Y )∗ decreases with d ln(Y )/d ln(G) and accordingly with dY/dG.21 The in-
tuition is that if the multiplier is high, government purchases are a very potent policy that can
bring the economy close to the efficient unemployment without distorting the allocation of out-
put between personal and government consumption. As the multiplier rises, fewer government
purchases are required to bring unemployment to its efficient level.
4. Construction of the Sufficient Statistics for the United States
This section proposes estimates for the sufficient statistics in formulas (7) and (12). The first
statistic is the government-purchases multiplier. We use the estimates reported by Ramey [2011a]
in her survey of the vast literature estimating multipliers. Table 1 in Ramey [2011a] shows that
in aggregate analyzes on US data, the range of estimates is 0.6–2.0 for multipliers financed by
20The explicit formula (12) indeed simplifies to the same expression when dY/dG→ 0.
21The explicit formula (13) indeed simplifies to the same expression when d ln(Y )/d ln(G)→ 1.
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deficit spending. If government purchases are financed by taxes but households are Ricardian,
the range 0.6–2.0 would also apply.22 If households are non-Ricardian, then the multiplier should
account for the effect of current higher taxes on output. Barro and Redlick [2011] propose that
the multiplier effect of taxes on output is −1.1, which implies that the relevant range of estimates
is -0.7–0.9.23 We use a multiplier of 0.5 as a baseline. Given the uncertainty of the multiplier
estimates, we also consider a range of estimates centered around 0.5.
The second statistic is the elasticity of substitution between government consumption and per-
sonal consumption. A Leontief utility function has an elasticity of 0. A Cobb-Douglas utility
function has an elasticity of 1. A linear utility function has an elasticity of +∞. We use an elastic-
ity of 1 as a baseline, and we also consider lower and higher values.
Using US data for the 1951–2014 period, we now estimate the remaining sufficient statistics:
the ratio of government consumption to personal consumption, market tightness, unemployment,
and the tightness elasticity of the job-finding rate.
4.1. The Ratio of Government Consumption to Personal Consumption
Using employment data constructed by the BLS from the Current Employment Statistics (CES)
survey, we measure G/C as the ratio of employment in the government industry to employment
in the private industry.24 Figure 3 plots G/C. The ratio G/C started at 15.5% in 1951, peaked at
24.0% in 1975, fell back to 20.0% in 1990, and averages 20.5% since 1990. The average of G/C
over the 1951–2014 period is 19.9%. Using G/Y = 1/(1+C/G), we find that the average of G/Y
over the 1951–2014 period is 16.6%.
Under the assumption that the government determines the trend of government purchases by
following the well-known Samuelson formula, the ratio (G/C)∗ can be measured as the low-
frequency trend of G/C.25 We produce this trend using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with smooth-
22Lump-sum taxation is equivalent to deficit financing with Ricardian households [Barro, 1974].
23Distortionary taxation (as opposed to lumpsum taxation) can also affect output and the multiplier, a point we
discuss in conclusion.
24Appendix C constructs an alternative measure of G/C using consumption expenditures data constructed by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) as part of the NIPA. The cyclical behavior of the two series is similar and almost
undistinguishable after 1980. We measure G/C with employment data to be consistent with our measure of market
tightness based on labor market data.
25If the trend of unemployment is efficient, it is optimal to determine the trend of government purchases with the
Samuelson formula.
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Figure 3: The Ratio of Government Consumption to Personal Consumption in the United States,
1951–2014
Notes: Government consumption G is the quarterly average of the seasonally adjusted monthly number of employees
in the government industry constructed by the BLS from the CES survey. Personal consumption C is the quarterly
average of the seasonally adjusted monthly number of employees in the private industry constructed by the BLS from
the CES survey. The ratio (G/C)∗ is the low-frequency trend of G/C produced with a HP filter with smoothing
parameter 105. The shaded areas represent the recessions identified by the NBER.
ing parameter 105 and the quarterly series for G/C. Figure 3 displays (G/C)∗. Last, Figure 3 also
displays the relative deviation (G/C− (G/C)∗)/(G/C)∗. US government purchases are mildly
countercyclical as the relative deviation increases in recessions and falls in expansions.
4.2. Market Tightness and Unemployment Rate
We measure market tightness by the ratio of vacancies to unemployment. We measure unem-
ployment by the number of unemployed persons constructed by the BLS from the CPS. In the
absence of long time series for vacancies, we construct a proxy for vacancies. We start from the
help-wanted advertising index constructed by Barnichon [2010].26 We then rescale the Barnichon
index to transform it into a number of vacancies. Namely, we scale up the index such that its aver-
age value between December 2000 and December 2014 matches the average number of vacancies
posted over the same period. The number of vacancies is measured by the BLS using data collected
in the Job Opening and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS).27
Figure 4 plots the market tightness x. Tightness averages 0.65 between 1951 and 2014. Under
26This index combines the online and print help-wanted advertising indices constructed by the Conference Board.
27The average value of the Barnichon index between December 2000 and December 2014 is 80.59. The average
number of vacancies from JOLTS between December 2000 and December 2014 is 3.707 millions. (The JOLTS only
started in December 2000.) Hence we multiply the Barnichon index by 3.707×106/80.59= 45,996 to obtain a proxy
for the number of vacancies since 1951.
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Figure 4: Market Tightness in the United States, 1951–2014
Notes: The market tightness x is the ratio of number of vacancies to unemployment level. The number of vacancies
is the quarterly average of the monthly vacancy index constructed by Barnichon [2010], scaled to match the number
of vacancies in JOLTS for 2001–2014. The unemployment level is the quarterly average of the seasonally adjusted
monthly number of unemployed persons constructed by the BLS from the CPS. The efficient market tightness x∗ is
the low-frequency trend of x produced with a HP filter with smoothing parameter 105. The shaded areas represent the
recessions identified by the NBER.
the assumption that the trend of the economy is efficient, the efficient tightness x∗ can be measured
as the low-frequency trend of x. We produce this trend using a HP filter with smoothing parameter
105 and the quarterly series for x. Figure 4 also displays x∗: it has been stable since 1951, falling
only slightly over time. Last, Figure 4 displays the relative deviation (x− x∗)/x∗. The tightness
departs from its efficient level over the business cycle: in booms the tightness is inefficiently high
(x > x∗), and in slumps the tightness is inefficiently low (x < x∗). These departures are very large.
We measure the unemployment rate u using the unemployed rate constructed by the BLS from
the CPS. Figure 5 plots the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate averages 5.9% between
1951 and 2014. Under the assumption that the trend of the economy is efficient, the efficient
unemployment rate u∗ can be measured as the low-frequency trend of u. We produce this trend
using a HP filter with smoothing parameter 105 and the quarterly series for u. Figure 5 also displays
u∗. We find that u∗ has been stable since 1951, falling only slightly over time. Last, Figure 5
displays the relative deviation (u−u∗)/u∗. The unemployment rate departs from its efficient level
over the business cycle: in booms the unemployment rate is inefficiently low (u < u∗), and in
slumps it is inefficiently high (u > u∗).
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Figure 5: Unemployment rate in the United States, 1951–2014
Notes: The unemployment rate u is the quarterly average of the seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment rate
constructed by the BLS from the CPS. The efficient unemployment rate u∗ is the low-frequency trend of u produced
with a HP filter with smoothing parameter 105. The shaded areas represent the recessions identified by the NBER.
4.3. The Tightness Elasticity of the Job-Finding Rate
To estimate the tightness elasticity of the job-finding rate, 1−η , we use the measures of market
tightness and unemployment rate described in Figures 4 and 5. Since the unemployment rate is
given by u = s/( f (x)+ s), a first-order approximation of ln(u) around ln(x∗) implies
ln(u)− ln(u∗) = d ln(u)
d ln(x)
· (ln(x)− ln(x∗)) =−(1−η) · (1−u∗) · (ln(x)− ln(x∗)) .
The scatter plot in Figure 6 indicates that the relationship between ln(u/u∗) and ln(x/x∗) is nearly
linear. We therefore estimate 1−η by running the following linear regression:
ln
(
ut
u∗t
)
= βˆ · ln
(
xt
x∗t
)
+ εt .
The estimate that we obtain by ordinary least squares is βˆ = 0.54, with standard error 0.010. As
showed in Figure 5, u∗ is broadly constant over time with an average value u∗ = 0.059. Hence, we
estimate that 1−η = 0.54./(1−0.059) = 0.57 and η = 0.43. Our estimate of η is in the range of
estimates in the literature.28
28In their survey, Petrongolo and Pissarides [2001] conclude that most estimates of η fall in the 0.4–0.7 range.
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Figure 6: Estimating the Tightness Elasticity of the Job-Finding Rate in the United States
Notes: The data used for the scatter plot are quarterly US data covering the 1951–2014 period. The actual and efficient
unemployment rates, u and u∗, are described in Figure 5. The actual and efficient market tightnesses, x and x∗, are
described in Figure 4. The plot also displays the least-squares regression line.
5. Policy Applications
In this section, we use our formulas and our estimates of the sufficient statistics for several policy
applications. These applications focus on the United States during the 1951–2014 period. First, we
show that US government purchases are not countercyclical enough for conventional estimates of
the multiplier and elasticity of substitution between government and personal consumptions. Sec-
ond, we show that US government purchases would only be optimal under very small values of the
multiplier and the elasticity of substitution. Last, for a range of multipliers and elasticity of substi-
tutions, we determine the optimal response of government purchases when the unemployment rate
increases from its average level of 5.9% to a high level of 9%.
5.1. Assessment of US Government Purchases
We determine whether US government purchases are countercyclical enough if the value of the
government-purchases multiplier is given by a midrange estimate from the literature, dY/dG= 0.5.
To evaluate US government purchases, we calculate the expression
G/C− (G/C)∗
(G/C)∗
+ ε · dY
dG
· x− x
∗
x∗
.
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Figure 7: Assessment of US Government Purchases, 1951–2014, for ε = 1 and dY/dG = 0.5
Notes: The figure evaluates equation (7). The ratios of government consumption to personal consumption, G/C and
(G/C)∗, are described in Figure 3. The actual and efficient market tightnesses, x and x∗, are described in Figure 4. The
shaded areas represent the recessions identified by the NBER.
If this expression is zero, the level of government purchases is optimal. In that case, formula (7)
holds. On the other hand, if this expression is positive, then government purchases are too high.
Last, if this expression is negative, government purchases are too low.
Figure 7 plots this expression using the sufficient statistics measured in Section 4. In partic-
ular, we set the elasticity of substitution between government and personal consumption and the
government-purchases multiplier to their benchmark values, ε = 1 and dY/dG = 0.5.
We find that the expression is systematically negative in slumps and positive in booms. For
instance, government consumption was insufficient in the recession years of 1982, 1991, 2001,
and 2009. We conclude that for a multiplier of 0.5 and an elasticity of substitution of 1, US
government purchases are not countercyclical enough; that is, government purchases should be
higher in slumps and lower in booms. This is not surprising because government purchases have
not been actively used for stabilization in the United States.29
5.2. Estimation of the Statistics Underlying US Government Purchases
We have found that US government purchases are not countercyclical enough if the value of the
government-purchases multiplier is 0.5—the best estimate from the literature. We now determine
29During the Great Recession, government expenditure dramatically increased with the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009. But government purchases of goods and services did not increase; the federal government
increased transfers and tax rebates, and federal government purchases increases were offset by reduced state and local
government purchases. See the description of US public expenditure during the 2000–2010 period by Taylor [2011].
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Figure 8: The Statistics Underlying US Government Purchases, 1951–2014
Notes: The data used in the figure are quarterly US data covering the 1951–2014 period. The actual and efficient market
tightnesses, x and x∗, are described in Figure 4. The ratios of government consumption to personal consumption, G/C
and (G/C)∗, are described in Figure 3. The scatter plot also displays the least-squares regression line. The shaded
areas represent the recessions identified by the NBER.
the value of the government-purchases multiplier that is consistent with observed government pur-
chases and market tightness in the United States. To do so, we exploit formula (7).
Formula (7) links the equilibrium values of optimal government purchases and market tight-
ness. When government purchases are optimal, the observed values of government purchases and
market tightness always satisfy formula (7). Therefore, we can regress (G/C− (G/C)∗)/(G/C)∗
on (x− x∗)/x∗ to estimate ε · (dY/dG). We run the regression
Gt/Ct− (Gt/Ct)∗
(Gt/Ct)∗
= βˆ · xt− x
∗
t
x∗t
+ εt .
The estimate that we obtain by ordinary least squares is βˆ = 0.03, with robust standard error
0.01. The regression is illustrated in Panel A of Figure 8. The regression analysis implies that
US government purchases are optimal under statistics ε · (dY/dG) = 0.03. For an elasticity of
substitution of ε = 1, the result implies that the US policy is optimal under a minuscule multiplier
of dY/dG = 0.03.
Panel B of Figure 8 presents the same result under a different angle. The panel evaluates the
implicit sufficient-statistics formula for optimal government purchases, given by (6), using the
statistics measured in US data, an elasticity ε = 1, and two different multipliers: dY/dG = 0.03
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and dY/dG= 0.5. A positive value at time t means that the right-hand side of (6) is larger than the
left-hand side at time t, and thus that the derivative of social welfare with respect to government
consumption g is positive, which means that government consumption g is insufficient. Consis-
tent with the previous regression result, we find that if the multiplier is dY/dG = 0.03, then US
government purchases are nearly optimal—formula (7) nearly holds at all time. In contrast, as we
saw in Figure 7, if the multiplier is dY/dG = 0.5, there is systematically insufficient government
consumption in slumps and excessive government consumption in booms.
In sum, either the product of the government-purchases multiplier by the elasticity of substitu-
tion is tiny (i.e., ε · (dY/dG)≈ 0.03) and US government purchases are optimal, or the product is
larger and US government purchases are not countercyclical enough.
5.3. Optimal Response of Government Purchases to an Unemployment Increase
We exploit the explicit formula, given by (12) to compute the optimal response of government
purchases to a given increase in unemployment. As an illustration, we consider an increase in
the unemployment rate from an efficient level of 5.9% to a high level of 9%. Table 2 displays
the optimal increase in government purchases for a range of estimates of the multiplier and the
elasticity of substitution between government and personal consumptions.
The first observation is that even with a small multiplier of 0.2, government purchases should
increase significantly when the unemployment rate increases from 5.9% to 9%. For an elasticity
of substitution of 0.5, the government purchases-output ratio should increase by 1.2 percentage
points from 16.6% to 17.8%; for an elasticity of substitution of 1, it should increase by 2.2 points;
and for an elasticity of substitution of 2, it should increase by 3.8 points. Thus, our theory suggests
that government purchases should be markedly countercyclical even for small positive multipliers.
The second observation is that the optimal increase in government purchases rises with the elas-
ticity of substitution between government consumption and personal consumption. For instance
with a multiplier of 0.5, the government purchases-output ratio should increase by 0.6 percent-
age points from 16.6% to 17.2% with a low elasticity of 0.1, but it should increase by 4.7 points
with a high elasticity of 3. Hence, the elasticity of substitution significantly influences the optimal
response of government purchases to a shock.
The third observation is that the optimal increase in government purchases does not rise mono-
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Table 2: Increase in Optimal Government Purchases-Output Ratio (in Percentage Points) When
the Unemployment Rate Rises from 5.9% to 9%
Elasticity of substitution between Government-purchases multiplier
government and personal consumptions 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 1.5
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.0
0.5 0.6 1.2 2.1 2.1 1.7
1 1.2 2.2 3.2 2.5 1.9
2 2.4 3.8 4.2 2.8 2.0
3 3.4 5.1 4.7 2.9 2.0
Notes: Initially, the unemployment rate is efficient and the government purchases-output ratio is given by the Samuel-
son formula, which is optimal. The efficient unemployment rate is set to u∗ = 5.9% and the Samuelson ratio to
(G/Y )∗ = 16.6%. The economy is hit by an unexpected permanent shock that brings the unemployment rate to
u0 = 9%. The table displays G/Y − (G/Y )∗ where G/Y is the optimal government purchases-output ratio after the
shock. The values of G/Y − (G/Y )∗ are computed using formula (12), the values indicated for the multiplier and the
elasticity of substitution, and η = 0.43. For negative multipliers dY/dG < 0, the decrease in the optimal government
purchases-output ratio is minus the value reported in the table for the positive multiplier |dY/dG|.
tonically with the multiplier. It is true that the optimal increase in government purchases rises
for low values of the multiplier. For instance with elasticity of substitution of 1, the government
purchases-output ratio should increase by 1.2 percentage points from 16.6% to 17.8% with a low
multiplier of 0.1, but it should increase by 3.2 with a multiplier of 0.5. However, the increase in
the optimal government purchases-output ratio diminishes for higher values of the multiplier. For
instance with the same elasticity of substitution of 1, the government purchases-output ratio should
only by 1.9 points with a multiplier of 1.5. The last column of Table 2 shows that, with a large
multiplier of 1.5, government purchases should fill the output gap and the value of ε becomes less
important.
The fourth observation is that we can directly use the table to obtain the optimal reduction in
the government purchases-output ratio if the multiplier was negative. Indeed, formula (12) is an
odd function of the multiplier. Hence, the optimal reduction in government purchases-output ratio
for a negative multiplier dY/dG < 0 as the same amplitude as the optimal increase the government
purchases-output ratio for the positive multiplier −dY/dG. For instance, with an elasticity of
substitution of 1 and a multiplier of −0.5, the optimal government purchases-output ratio should
decreased by 3.2 percentage points when the unemployment rate rises from 5.9% to 9%.
To illustrate the hump-shaped relation between positive multipliers and the optimal increase
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Figure 9: Change of the Optimal Government Purchases-Output Ratio When the Unemployment
Rate Increases from 5.9% to 9%, for a Range of Government-Purchases Multiplier
Notes: Initially, the unemployment rate is efficient and the government purchases-output ratio is given by the Samuel-
son formula, which is optimal. The efficient unemployment rate is set to u∗ = 5.9% and the Samuelson ratio to
(G/Y )∗ = 16.6%. The economy is hit by an unexpected permanent shock that brings the unemployment rate to
u0 = 9%. The figure displays G/Y − (G/Y )∗ where G/Y is the optimal government purchases-output ratio after the
shock. The values of G/Y − (G/Y )∗ are computed using formula (13), values of the multiplier between −3 and 3,
ε = 1, and η = 0.43.
in government purchases-output ratio, we plot the relationship in Figure 9. We consider again an
increase in the unemployment rate from 5.9% to 9%. The figure displays the optimal increase in
government purchases-output ratio when the multiplier ranges from -3 to 3. Since we consider a
broad range of multipliers, we use formula (13), which is more precise than (12) for large mul-
tipliers. Of course, the government purchases-output ratio should not increase if the multiplier is
0. For positive multipliers, the ratio G/Y should increase. The largest increase is obtained for a
multiplier of 0.5. At this multiplier, the government purchases-output ratio should increase by 3.2
percentage points. For larger multipliers, the optimal increase in the government purchases-output
ratio falls: the government purchases-output ratio should only increase by 2.2 percentage points
for a multiplier of 1, by 1 percentage point for a multiplier of 2, and by 0.5 percentage point for
a multiplier of 3. The same pattern appears for negative multipliers, except that in that case the
government purchases-output ratio should decrease after the increase in unemployment rate.
6. A Specific Model
In this section, we propose a fully specified model. We link the parameters of the model to the
sufficient statistics that we introduced in Section 3. We explain in particular which parameters
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determine the value of the multiplier. We calibrate and simulate the model under aggregate demand
shocks.30 We use these simulations to validate the accuracy of our approximate explicit formula.
We consider a model with wealth in the utility as in Michaillat and Saez [2014] to capture
simply aggregate demand shocks. Higher marginal utility of wealth leads households to want to
save more and consume less, which depresses aggregate demand and gross output. As in Section 4,
we assume that the tightness and unemployment in the average state are efficient. We also assume
that government purchases are optimal in the average state. We denote with an upper bar average
state values.
6.1. Households
The representative household spends part of its labor income on labor services and saves part of it
as bonds. For simplicity, we assume that government purchases are financed by a lump-sum tax.31
The law of motion of the household’s assets is
b˙(t) = Y (x(t))− (1+ τ(x(t))) · c(t)+ r(t) ·b(t)−T (t). (14)
Here, b(t) are real bond holdings, c(t) is net personal consumption, (1+ τ(x(t))) · c(t) is gross
personal consumption, Y (x(t)) is labor income, r(t) is the real interest rate, and T (t) is the lump-
sum tax paid to the government.
The representative household derives utility from consuming the c(t) services that it purchases,
consuming the g(t) services purchased by the government, and holding b(t) units of real wealth.
Its instantaneous utility function is separable: U (c(t),g(t))+V (b(t)). The function V is dif-
ferentiable, strictly increasing, and concave. Utility for wealth is a simple way to introduce an
30The empirical evidence presented in Michaillat and Saez [2015], based on the type of matching model used here,
suggests that business cycles in the US are mostly caused by aggregate demand shocks.
31The government could finance government purchases with debt. If households are Ricardian—in the sense that
they do not view government bonds as net wealth because such bonds need to be repaid with taxes later on—debt
financing is economically equivalent to a lump-sum tax and budget balance, exactly as in Barro [1974]. If the govern-
ment uses debt financing and households are not Ricardian, or if the government uses a distortionary tax on consump-
tion, our formulas would remain valid, but the equilibrium function x(g) would differ. This means that the expression
for the multiplier that we derive below would be different.
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aggregate demand in a real economy without money.32 The function U is given by
U (c,g) =
[
(1− γ) ·
(c
c
) ε−1
ε
+ γ ·
(
g
g
) ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
. (15)
The function U has constant returns to scale and constant elasticity of substitution ε ≥ 0. The
parameters g and c are the values of g and c in the average state. The parameter γ ∈ (0,1) gives
the optimal government purchases-output ratio in the average state. Indeed, the marginal rate
of substitution in the average state is MRS = [γ/(1− γ)] · (g/c). Optimal government purchases
satisfy MRS = 1 in the average state because this state is efficient. Hence, the optimal government
purchases-output ratio in the average state satisfies g/y = γ .
The utility function of a household at time 0 is the discounted sum of instantaneous utilities∫+∞
0 e
−δ ·t · [U (c(t),g(t))+V (b(t))]dt, where δ > 0 is the subjective discount rate. Given initial
real wealth b(0) = 0 and the paths for market tightness, government purchases, real interest rate,
and tax [x(t),g(t),r(t),T (t)]+∞t=0, the household chooses paths for consumption and real wealth
[c(t),b(t)]+∞t=0 to maximize its utility function subject to (14).
6.2. Market for Bonds and Real Interest Rate
Households can issue or buy riskless real bonds. Bonds are traded on a perfectly competitive
market. Household hold bonds to smooth future consumption and because they derive utility from
real wealth, which can only be stored in bonds. At time t, a household holds b(t) bonds, and the
rate of return on bonds is the real interest rate r(t). In equilibrium, the bond market clears and
b(t) = 0. Hence, the aggregate real wealth in the economy is zero.
In the economy there are two goods: labor services and bonds. Hence there is only one relative
price. The price of bonds relative to services is determined by the real interest rate. In a Walrasian
market, the real interest rate would be determined such that supply equals demand on the market
for labor services. In our matching market, things are different: we specify a price mechanisms for
the real interest rate, and the market tightness will adjust such that supply equals demand on the
32See Michaillat and Saez [2014] for more details. Another possibility would be to introduce utility for money
as in Michaillat and Saez [2015], or more generally utility for a nonproduced good. The formulation with wealth is
the simplest, since it does not require the introduction of an additional good, and it captures the idea that shifts in
thriftiness create aggregate demand shocks.
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market for labor services.
A common assumption in the matching literature is that prices are efficient—they maintain the
economy at the efficient unemployment rate u∗.33 The efficient real interest rate is
r∗ = δ − (1+ τ(x∗)) · V
′(0)
∂U
∂c (y
∗−g,g) .
If the interest rate always adjusts to r∗, then the economy is always efficient x = x∗, y = y(x∗),
and hence government purchases g have no effect on tightness and output and the Samuelson rule
should always hold. In practice, the economy experiences business cycles with large variations in
tightness. To capture this, we assume that the interest rate is not perfectly flexible. We consider a
fairly general interest-rate schedule of the form:
r = δ − (δ − r) ·
(
V ′(0)
V ′(0)
)1−α
·
(
∂U
∂c (y−g,g)
∂U
∂c (y
∗−g,g)
)1−β
. (16)
The parameter r is the real interest rate in the average state:
r = δ − (1+ τ(x)) · V
′(0)
∂U
∂c (y−g,g)
. (17)
The parameter α ∈ [0,1] measures the rigidity of the real interest rate to aggregate demand shocks.
If α = 1, the real interest rate is fully rigid: it does not respond at all to aggregate demand shocks.
If α = 0, the real interest rate is fully flexible: it responds as much to aggregate demand shocks as
the efficient real interest rate, and aggregate demand shocks are fully absorbed by the real interest
rate. The parameter β ∈ [0,1] measures the rigidity of the real interest rate to changes in the
marginal utility of personal consumption. If β = 1, the real interest rate is fully rigid: it does not
respond at all to shocks to the marginal utility of personal consumption. If β = 0, the real interest
rate is fully flexible: it responds as much to shocks to the marginal utility of personal consumption
as the efficient real interest rate. We will see that when β = 0, government purchases shocks are
completely absorbed by the real interest rate such that the aggregate demand does not depend on
government purchases and the multiplier is zero.
33Another typical assumption is that prices are determined by bargaining. Bargained prices usually have similar
properties to efficient prices [Michaillat and Saez, 2015].
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The interest rate schedule can be interpreted as representing the behavior of the central bank.
If α = β = 0, the interest rate is always efficient: r = r∗. This happens when the central bank is
always able to maintain the unemployment rate at its efficient level. If α = β = 1, the interest rate
is totally rigid: r = r. This happens when the central bank is unable to affect the real interest rate.
This would happen if inflation were fixed and the nominal interest rate at the zero lower bound.34
6.3. The Market for Labor Services
We use a Cobb-Douglas matching function h(1−Y,v)=ω ·(1−Y )η ·v1−η . The parameterω is the
matching efficacy. The parameter η ∈ (0,1) is the elasticity of matching with respect to available
capacity. The job-finding rate is f (x) = ω · x1−η so the tightness elasticity of the job-finding rate
is 1−η . The vacancy-filling rate is q(x) = ω · x−η . The function y(x), defined by (3), admits a
unique maximum at x∗.
6.4. Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a dynamical system that we describe in Appendix D. We also show in Ap-
pendix D that the system is a source, with no state variables, so that it converges immediately to
its steady state. We therefore only describe the steady state of the equilibrium. The equilibrium
is composed of five variables: g, c, y, r, and x. Net government consumption g is chosen by the
government. The real interest rate r is given by the schedule (16). Net output is given by y = y(x),
where y(x) is defined by (3). Solving the household’s problem, we find that c satisfies
V ′(0)
∂U
∂c (c,g)
=
δ − r
1+ τ(x)
. (18)
This equation is the standard Euler equation, modified in the presence of utility of wealth, and
evaluated in steady state. The only constraint on the real interest rate is r < δ ; hence, we can
accommodate a negative real interest rate in steady state. Let c(x,g,r) be the amount of net personal
consumption implicitly defined by this equation. The constraint that c+ g = y can be written as
c(x,g,r)+g = y(x), which determines equilibrium tightness.
34Michaillat and Saez [2014] describe such a situation.
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6.5. Government-Purchases Multiplier
Our formulas for optimal government purchases rely on three main sufficient statistics: the elas-
ticity of substitution between government and personal consumptions, the tightness elasticity of
the job-finding rate, and the government-purchases multiplier. The first two statistics are directly
linked to two parameters of the model: the parameter ε in the utility function and the parameter η
in the matching function. Here we explain how the third statistic—the multiplier—relates to the
parameters of the model.
PROPOSITION 6. In the specific model the multiplier satisfies
d ln(Y )
d ln(G)
=
[
1− (1−β ) · 1−G/Y
1−G/Y ∗ ·
z(G/(Y −G))
z(G/(Y ∗−G))
]
·
[
1+ ε · η
1−η ·
τ
u
·C
Y
· z
(
G
C
)]−1
where the auxiliary function z is defined by
z(θ)≡ 1+ 1− γ
γ
·
(
g
c
· 1
θ
) ε−1
ε
.
In the average state, in which the unemployment rate is efficient and government purchases are
optimal, the multiplier simplifies to dY/dG = β/ [γ+ ε · (1− γ)]. In addition, if the elasticity of
substitution between government and personal consumptions is ε = 1, then the multiplier in the
average state simplifies to dY/dG = β .
The proof is relegated to Appendix E. The proposition explains how to calibrate the interest-
rate schedule to match empirical evidence. As discussed in Section 4, the literature suggests that
a good estimate of the multiplier is dY/dG = 0.5. By calibrating β appropriately, we will ensure
that the multiplier is 0.5 in the average state.
Since τ/u is high when the unemployment rate is low, the expression for the multiplier indicates
that the multiplier is high when the unemployment rate is high, in line with the empirical evidence
provided by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012]. The mechanism behind the fluctuations of the
multiplier is similar to that described in Michaillat [2014].
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Figure 10: Simulations of Specific Model Under Aggregate Demand Shocks
6.6. Calibration and Simulations
To describe more precisely the fluctuations of optimal government purchases over the business
cycle, we calibrate and simulate our model under aggregate demand shocks. Appendix D shows
that the economy jumps from one steady-state equilibrium to another in response to unexpected
permanent shocks. Hence, we represent the different stages of the business cycle as a succession of
steady states. We simulate business cycles generated by aggregate demand shocks by computing
a collection of steady states parameterized by different values for the marginal utility of wealth,
V ′(0). In each case, we perform two simulations: one in which the government purchases-output
ratio G/Y remains constant at its average value, and one in which the ratio is at its optimal level,
given by formula (6).
We calibrate the model to US data for 1951–2014. The calibration ensures that the simulations
match the evidence from Section 4 on the sufficient statistics at the heart of our formulas. Thus,
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we set the parameter ε in the utility function to 1 and the parameter η in the matching function
to 0.43.35 Since we target a multiplier of 0.5 in the average state, we set the parameter β in the
interest-rate schedule to 0.5.36 The rest of the calibration is standard and relegated to Appendix F.
Since there is considerable uncertainty about the values of the elasticity of substitution and
multiplier, we perform additional simulations targeting ε = 0.5, ε = 2, dY/dG= 0.2, and dY/dG=
1. These simulations are presented in Appendix G.
Figure 10 displays the simulations of the calibrated model under aggregate demand shocks.
Each steady state is indexed by a marginal utility of wealth V ′(0) ∈ [0.97,1.03]. Because of the
rigidity of the real interest rate, the steady states with low V ′(0) represent booms: they have a
relatively low interest rate and therefore low unemployment. Conversely, the steady states with
high V ′(0) represent slumps: they have a relatively high interest rate and high unemployment.
As showed in Panels A and B, unemployment rises from 4.0% to 9.6%, and output falls accord-
ingly, when V ′(0) increases from 0.97 to 1.03 and the government purchases-output ratio remains
constant. Panel C displays the multiplier. On average the multiplier is 0.5, matching exactly the
empirical evidence thanks to our calibration of the parameter β . The multiplier is countercyclical,
increasing from 0.26 to 1.01 when the unemployment rate increases from 4.0% to 9.6%.
The model is calibrated so that the unemployment rate is efficient in the average state (V ′(0) =
1). Hence, the unemployment rate is inefficiently high in slumps (V ′(0) > 1) and inefficiently
low in booms (V ′(0) < 1). Since the multiplier is positive, the government purchases-output
ratio should be more generous than the Samuelson ratio in slumps and less generous in booms.
Panel D displays the optimal government purchases-output ratio. The optimal ratio is markedly
countercyclical, increasing from 14.1% when V ′(0) = 0.97 to 19.7% when V ′(0) = 1.03.
Of course, the unemployment rate responds to the adjustment of government purchases from
their original level of 16.6% to their optimal level. In slumps, optimal government purchases are
much higher than 16.6% so the unemployment rate is below its original level: at V ′(0) = 1.03
the unemployment rate falls by 2.5 percentage points from 9.6% to 7.1%. In booms, optimal
government purchases are below 16.6% so the unemployment rate is above its original level: at
V ′(0) = 0.97 the unemployment rate increases by 0.8 percentage point from 4.0% to 4.8%.
35This yields a Cobb-Douglas utility function: U (c,g) = (c/c)γ · (g/g)1−γ .
36Proposition 6 establishes the link between the parameter β and the value of the multiplier.
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Figure 11: Accuracy of the Approximate Explicit Formula
Finally, we use simulations to evaluate the accuracy of the approximate explicit formula, given
by (12). We find that despite its simplicity, the explicit formula is very accurate. Figure 11 com-
pares the optimal government purchases obtained with the exact implicit sufficient-statistics for-
mula, given by (6), and with the explicit formula. Around the average state (V ′(0)= 1), the govern-
ment purchases-output ratio given by the two formulas are indistinguishable. The approximation
is less precise further away from the average state, but it remains satisfactory: at V ′(0) = 0.97, the
exact formula gives G/Y = 14.1% while the approximate explicit formula gives G/Y = 14.7%;
at V ′(0) = 1.03, the exact formula gives G/Y = 19.7% while the approximate explicit formula
gives G/Y = 20.4%. Despite these discrepancies, the social welfare values resulting from the two
formulas are nearly identical.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we study the optimal use of government purchases for macroeconomic stabilization.
We derive formulas for optimal government purchases expressed with estimable sufficient statis-
tics. Our analysis provides several general insights on the conduct of government purchases to
stabilize business cycles. Some of these insights confirm intuitions that macroeconomists have had
for a long time. First, even in a macroeconomic model with unemployment, the Samuelson [1954]
formula holds as long as the unemployment rate is efficient. Second, the government-purchases
multiplier, which is one of the most commonly estimated statistic in macroeconomics, does matter
for the optimal level of government purchases.
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Other insights are more unexpected. First, the cutoff value of the multiplier that justifies an
increase in government purchases in slumps is not 1 but 0. With any positive multiplier, it is
optimal to increase government purchases above the Samuelson level when the unemployment rate
is inefficiently high, even though government purchases crowd out personal consumption. In fact,
with statistics calibrated to the US economy and an elasticity of substitution between government
and personal consumptions of 1, the optimal government purchases-output ratio rises by significant
amounts when the unemployment rate increases from its average level of 5.9% to a high level of
9%—even for small multipliers. For instance, the optimal ratio increases by 1.2, 2.2, and 3.2
percentage points for multipliers of 0.1, 0.2, and 0.5.
Second, for positive multipliers, the relation between the size of the multiplier and the increase
of the optimal government purchases-output ratio following an increase in unemployment is not
increasing but hump-shaped, with a peak for a multiplier of about 0.5 where the optimal ratio in-
creases by 3.2 percentage points when the unemployment rate increases from 5.9% to 9%. The
optimal ratio increases less for multipliers above 0.5 because when multipliers are large, a higher
multiplier means that fewer government purchases are required to fill the unemployment gap. The
optimal ratio increases less for multipliers below 0.5 because when multipliers are small, a smaller
multiplier means that government purchases crowd out personal consumption more and are there-
fore less desirable. For example, the optimal government purchases-output ratio increases only by
1.0 percentage points for a multiplier of 2, the same as for a multiplier of 0.08.
Third, there is another statistic that has been neglected but is as important as the multiplier
to determine the optimal level of government purchases: the elasticity of substitution between
government and personal consumptions. The increase of the optimal government purchases-output
ratio following an increase in unemployment is larger for larger elasticities of substitutions. For
instance, for a multiplier of 0.5, the optimal ratio increases by 0.6, 2.1, and 4.2 percentage points
for elasticities of 0.1, 0.5, and 2.
Fourth, a negative multiplier does not mean that government purchases should not respond
to unemployment fluctuations; instead, it means that government purchases should be below the
Samuelson level when the unemployment rate is inefficiently high and above the Samuelson level
when the unemployment rate is inefficiently low. It is only for a multiplier of 0 that the government
purchases-output ratio should remain constant at the Samuelson level.
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Overall, our analysis suggests that government purchases should be a key tool for macroeco-
nomic stabilization as soon as the government-purchases multiplier and the elasticity of substitu-
tion between government and personal consumptions are positive. Even away from the zero lower
bound, unemployment fluctuates a lot, which indicates that monetary policy may not be able to
stabilize the economy perfectly. This could be because monetary policy takes time to become
effective—for instance, if a change in the federal funds rate takes time to percolate through the
economy and influence the interest rates faced by households and firms. Any time that the unem-
ployment rate is inefficient—irrespective of monetary policy—our analysis suggests that govern-
ment purchases should be adjusted, sometimes by a sizable amount. In practice, adjusting govern-
ment purchases may take time and there may be a time lag to implement government purchases.
To reduce time lags and make this policy effective, the government should automatize govern-
ment purchases, much in the same way as unemployment insurance extensions are automatic in
the United States. A possibility would be to keep a long list of useful government purchases (ei-
ther services or investment projects valued by society) and go down or up the list as more or less
government purchases become desirable over the business cycle.
If government purchases are financed with distortionary taxation, an important extension of
the theory would be to include supply-side responses. If labor income is taxed and households
choose their productive capacity, changes in government purchases will affect the tax rate and the
productive capacity supplied by households. In that case, changes in government purchases affect
output through its mechanical effect on aggregate demand, and through its effect on aggregate
supply triggered by tax distortions. The correction term in the formula should still depend on how
marginal government purchases affect tightness. However, this effect is no longer measured by the
standard macro multiplier. Instead, it is measured by the macro multiplier minus a micro multiplier
that measures the supply-side response to government purchases through distortionary taxation.37
Introducing endogenous productive capacity would describe other interesting phenomena, such
as the effect of government purchases on labor force participation through its influence on the
job-finding rate and returns to job search.
The methodology developed in this paper could help bridge the gap between the analysis of
37These results are reminiscent of those in Landais, Michaillat and Saez [2010]. They analyze optimal unemploy-
ment insurance in a matching model and find that the correction term relative to the standard Baily-Chetty formula
depends on the difference between the macro and micro responses of unemployment to unemployment insurance.
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optimal taxation, transfers, social insurance, and public-good provision in public economics and
the analysis of stabilization policies in macroeconomics. This agenda is related to the new dy-
namic public finance literature that conducts optimal policy analysis in dynamic macroeconomic
models [Golosov, Tsyvinski and Werning, 2006; Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2015; Golosov, Troshkin
and Tsyvinski, 2011; Kocherlakota, 2010]. It is also related to the work of Farhi and Werning
[2013], who propose a framework to study optimal macroprudential policies in the presence of
price rigidities. In that framework they obtain the same decomposition of optimal policies into a
standard public-economics policy plus a correction term capturing stabilization motives.
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Appendix A: Output and Matching Wedge
In this appendix we derive the relationships between output and tightness and matching wedge and
tightnessgiven in the text.
We first derive the relationship between output and tightness. The law of motion for output is
Y˙ (t) = f (x(t)) · (1−Y (t))− s ·Y (t).
In this law of motion, f (x(t)) · (1−Y (t)) is the number of long-term relationships created at t and
s ·Y (t) is the number of long-term relationships separated at t. We assume that the transitional
dynamics of Y (t) are fast. This implies that Y (t) barely departs from its steady-state level where
Y˙ (t) = 0. Imposing Y˙ (t) = 0 into the law of motion for Y (t), we find that Y (t) satisfies
0 = f (x(t)) · (1−Y (t))− s ·Y (t)
Y (t) =
f (x(t))
f (x(t))+ s
.
We now derive the relationship between matching wedge and tightness. The household adver-
tises vacancies to purchase services. At time t, the household adjusts its gross consumption by C˙(t),
and it also replaces the s ·C(t) relationships that have just separated. Making these C˙(t)+ s ·C(t)
new relationships requires
(
C˙(t)+ s ·C(t))/q(x(t)) vacancies, each costing ρ services. Hence,
gross and net consumption related by the following differential equation:
C(t) = c(t)+
ρ
q(x(t))
· (C˙(t)+ s ·C(t)) .
We assume that the transitional dynamics of C(t) are fast. This implies that C(t) barely departs
from its steady-state level where C˙(t) = 0. Imposing C˙(t) = 0 into the law of motion for C(t), we
find that C(t) satisfies
C(t) ·
[
1− s ·ρ
q(x(t))
]
= c(t).
or equivalently
C(t) =
[
1+
s ·ρ
q(x(t))− s ·ρ
]
· c(t).
The government purchases services on the market in the same way as households do. Hence, gross
and net government consumptions are also related by
G(t) =
[
1+
s ·ρ
q(x(t))− s ·ρ
]
·g(t).
We infer the expression for the matching wedge from these relationships between gross and net
consumptions.
46
Appendix B: Validation of the Main Approximations
In this appendix, we use US data for the 1951-2014 period to validate the three main approxima-
tions made in the analysis.
Irrelevance of Transitional Dynamics for the Unemployment Rate
We argue here that transitional dynamics for unemployment are unimportant. We begin by con-
structing a time series for the job-finding rate. The monthly job-finding rate is defined by ft =
− ln(1−Ft), where Ft is the monthly job-finding probability.38 We construct a time series for Ft
following the method developed by Shimer [2012]. We use the relationship
Ft = 1−
ut+1−ust+1
ut
,
where ut is the number of unemployed persons at time t and ust is the number of short-term unem-
ployed persons at time t. We measure ut and ust in the data constructed by the BLS from the CPS.
The number of short-term unemployed persons is the number of unemployed persons with zero to
four weeks duration, adjusted as in Shimer [2012] for the 1994–2014 period. Panel A of Figure A1
displays the monthly job-finding rate. The job-finding rate averages 56% between 1951 and 2014.
Next, we construct the separation rate following the method developed by Shimer [2012]. The
separation rate st is implicitly defined by
ut+1 =
(
1− e− ft−st
)
· st
ft + st
·ht + e− ft−st ·ut ,
where ht is the number of persons in the labor force in period t, ut is the number of unemployed per-
sons at time t, and ft is the monthly job-finding rate. We measure ut and ht in the data constructed
by the BLS from the CPS, and we use the series that we have just constructed for ft . Panel B of
Figure A1 displays the monthly separation rate. The separation rate averages 3.3% between 1951
and 2014.
Finally, we compare the fluctuations of the actual unemployment rate with those of the steady-
state unemployment rate, computed using
ut =
st
ft + st
(A1)
and our measures of the job-finding and separation rates. The two series, displayed in Panel C
of Figure A1, are almost identical. Since the actual unemployment rate barely departs from its
steady-state level, the transitional dynamics of the unemployment rate are unimportant.39
38To obtain the relationship between ft and Ft , we assume that unemployed workers find a job according to a Poisson
process with arrival rate ft .
39Panel C is similar to Figure 1 in Hall [2005]. Even though we use different measures of the job-finding and
separation rates and a longer time period, Hall’s conclusion that transitional dynamics are irrelevant remains valid.
47
1960 1975 1990 20050
0.3
0.6
0.9
1.2
A. Job-finding rate (per month)
1960 1975 1990 20050
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
s
s
B. Separation rate (per month)
1960 1975 1990 2005 0%
 3%
 6%
 9%
12% Actual
Approximate
C. Actual and approximate unemployment rates
Figure A1: The Irrelevance of Transitional Dynamics For the Unemployment Rate
Notes: Panel A: The job-finding rate is constructed from CPS data following the methodology of Shimer [2012].
Panel B: The separation rate s is constructed from CPS data following the methodology of Shimer [2012]. The series
s is the low-frequency trend of s produced with a HP filter with smoothing parameter 105. Panel C: The actual
unemployment rate is the quarterly average of the seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment rate constructed by the
BLS from the CPS. The approximate unemployment rate is computed using (A1). This approximate rate abstracts
from transitional dynamics. The shaded areas represent the recessions identified by the NBER.
Approximation of 1− [η/(1−η)] · τ/u by −(x− x∗)/x∗
In the derivation of formula (7), we approximate 1− [η/(1−η)] ·τ/u with−(x−x∗)/x∗. The term
1− [η/(1−η)] · τ/u is an important part of formula (6) as it measures the effect of gross output
on net output. We now validate this approximation.
We begin by measuring the matching wedge τ . To construct τ , we use the property that
τ =
s ·ρ
q− s ·ρ . (A2)
We use the separation rate s described in Panel B of Figure A1. We construct the vacancy-filling
rate as q = f/x, where x is the market tightness displayed in Figure 4 and f is the job-finding rate
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Figure A2: Matching Cost and Matching Wedge in the United States, 1951–2014
Notes: Panel A: The vacancy-filling rate q is computed using q= f/x. The job-finding rate f is described in Figure A1.
The market tightness x is described in Figure 4. The series q is the low-frequency trends of q produced with a HP filter
with smoothing parameter 105. Panel B: The matching cost is computed using equation (A4). Panel C: The matching
wedge τ is computed using equation (A2). The series τ is computed using equation (A3). The shaded areas represent
the recessions identified by the NBER.
described in Panel A of Figure A1. Panel A of Figure A2 displays the monthly vacancy-filling rate.
The vacancy-filling rate averages 94% between 1951 and 2014.
We construct the matching cost ρ as a slow-moving variable such that on average, the market
is efficient. If the market is efficient on average, then (4) implies that
τ =
1−η
η
·u, (A3)
where τ is the average value of the matching wedge and u the average value of the unemployment
rate. We set η = 0.43 and construct u as the low-frequency trend of u produced with a HP filter
with smoothing parameter 105. This procedure yields τ . We also construct the average values of
the vacancy-filling rate and separation rate, q and s, by taking the low-frequency trends of q and s
produced with a HP filter with smoothing parameter 105. Using the resulting series, we construct
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Figure A3: Approximating 1− η1−η · τu by −x−x
∗
x∗ and 1− η1−η · τu · GY · dYdG by 1
Notes: The unemployment rate u is described in Figure 5. The matching wedge τ is described in Figure A2. The term
−(x− x∗)/x∗ is computed using the market tightness x and the efficient market tightnesses x∗ described in Figure 4.
The terms 1− [η/(1−η)] ·τ/u and 1− [η/(1−η)] · (τ/u) · (G/Y ) · (dY/dG) are computed using τ and u and setting
η = 0.43. To compute the second term, we set dY/dG = 0.5 and use the government purchases-output ratio G/Y =
(G/C)/(1+G/C) from Figure 3. The shaded areas represent the recessions identified by the NBER.
ρ as the slow-moving variable
ρ =
q
s
· τ
1+ τ
. (A4)
This equation is just (A2), evaluated in the average state. Panel B of Figure A2 displays the
resulting matching cost. The matching cost averages 2.0 between 1951 and 2014, and it increases
significantly over time.
Using our series for s, q, and ρ , we construct a time series for τ . Panel C of Figure A2 displays
the matching wedge. The matching wedge is very procyclical, with an average value of 7.8%
between 1951 and 2014.
Finally, we use our series for τ , set η = 0.43, and use the unemployment rate described in
Figure 5 to construct 1− [η/(1−η)] · τ/u. Panel A of Figure A3 displays the time series for
1− [η/(1−η)] · τ/u. Panel A also displays −(x− x∗)/x∗, constructed using the series described
in Figure 4. These two series are nearly indistinguishable, which validates the approximation.
Approximation of 1− [η/(1−η)] · (τ/u) · (G/Y ) · (dY/dG) by 1
In the derivation of formula (7), we approximate 1− [η/(1−η)] · (τ/u) · (G/Y ) · (dY/dG) by 1.
It is simple to assess this approximation. We set dY/dG = 0.5 and η = 0.43, as discussed in Sec-
tion 4. We construct a series for G/Y as (G/C)/(1+G/C), where G/C is the ratio of government
consumption to personal consumption described in Figure 3. We use the unemployment rate u
described in Figure 5 and the matching wedge τ described in Panel C of Figure A2. Panel B of
Figure A3 displays the resulting time series for 1− [η/(1−η)] · (τ/u) · (G/Y ) · (dY/dG). The
series is close to 1, especially in slumps: in most slumps, it is around 0.95; at all time except in the
early 1970s, it is above 0.85; and on average between 1951 and 2014, it is 0.91. This means that
the approximation is quite accurate.
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Figure A4: Government Consumption Expenditures and Government Employment in the United
States, 1951–2014
Notes: Panel A: Government consumption G is seasonally adjusted quarterly government consumption expendi-
tures in dollars constructed by the BEA as part of the NIPA. Personal consumption C is seasonally adjusted quar-
terly personal consumption expenditures in dollars constructed by the BEA as part of the NIPA. The ratio (G/C)∗
is the low-frequency trend of G/C produced with a HP filter with smoothing parameter 105. Panel B: The ratio
[G/C− (G/C)∗]/(G/C)∗ measured from consumption expenditures data uses the ratios G/C and (G/C)∗ described
in Panel A. The ratio [G/C− (G/C)∗]/(G/C)∗ measured from employment data uses the ratios G/C and (G/C)∗
described in Figure 3. The shaded areas represent the recessions identified by the NBER.
Appendix C: Government Consumption Expenditures
In this appendix, we construct an alternative measure of the ratio between government consumption
and personal consumption, G/C, for the United States between 1951 and 2014. We measure G with
government consumption expenditures constructed by the BEA as part of the NIPA. We measure C
by the personal consumption expenditures constructed by the BEA as part of the NIPA. Figure A4
displays the resulting series.
The two measures of G/C–that based on employment data and plotted in Figure 3 and that
based on consumption expenditures data and plotted in Figure A4—have fairly different levels.
The ratio G/C based on consumption expenditures data is always higher. It was much higher at
the beginning of the period (0.31 against 0.16 in 1953). The gap between the two measures shrank
until 1990. Since then the gap has been roughly constant, the measure based on consumption
expenditures data hovering between 0.21 and 0.25 and the measure based on employment data
hovering between 0.19 and 0.21.
However, since 1980, the ratios (G/C− (G/C)∗)/(G/C)∗ obtained from government expendi-
tures data and employment data nearly perfectly overlap. This ratio matters more than the level of
G/C because it enters into most of our formulas for optimal government purchases and determines
the value of 1−MRSgc. Since changes in government expenditures compared to trend almost ex-
actly track changes in government employment compared to trend, how we measure government
purchases does not matter much for our analysis.
Before 1980, the two ratios do not overlap as well because of the Korean and Vietnam wars.
The ratio based on consumption expenditures data is especially high in 1951–1953, which cor-
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responds to the Korean war, and in 1967–1972, which corresponds to the Vietnam war. Since
military personnel does not count as government employees in BLS data, and since wars involve
important purchases of military equipment, government expenditures during wars rise whereas
government employment does not change much. Accordingly, wars create a discrepancy between
our two measures of (G/C− (G/C)∗)/(G/C)∗.
Appendix D: Equilibrium of the Specific Model
In this appendix we derive and analyze the dynamical system describing the equilibrium of the
specific model of Section 6. An equilibrium consists of paths for market tightness, net personal
consumption, net government consumption, net output, real wealth, and real interest rate, [x(t),
c(t), g(t), y(t), b(t), r(t)]+∞t=0. The equilibrium consists of 6 variables, so it requires 6 conditions to
be well defined.
The first condition is that the government chooses a fixed amount of government consumption:
g(t) = g. The second condition is that a price mechanism determines the real interest rate: r(t) is
given by (16). The third condition is that the bond market is in equilibrium: b(t) = 0. The fourth
condition is that the market for services is in equilibrium: c(t)+g(t) = y(t). The fifth condition is
that the matching process determines net output: y(t) = y(x(t)).
The sixth condition is that the representative household chooses net personal consumption to
maximize utility subject to its budget constraint. To solve the household’s problem, we set up the
current-value Hamiltonian:
H (t,c(t),b(t)) =U (c(t),g(t))+V (b(t))+λ (t) · [Y (x(t))− (1+ τ(x(t))) · c(t)+ r(t) ·b(t)−T (t)]
with control variable c(t), state variable b(t), and current-value costate variable λ (t). Throughout
we use subscripts to denote partial derivatives. The necessary conditions for an interior solution
to this maximization problem are ∂H /∂c = 0, ∂H /∂b = δ ·λ (t)− λ˙ (t), and the transversality
condition limt→+∞ e−δ ·t ·λ (t) ·b(t) = 0. Given that U and V are concave and thatH is the sum
of U , V , and a linear function of (c,b), H is concave in (c,b) and these conditions are also
sufficient. These two first-order conditions imply that
∂U
∂c
(c(t),g(t)) = λ (t) · (1+ τ(x(t))) (A5)
V ′(b(t)) = (δ − r(t)) ·λ (t)− λ˙ (t). (A6)
Recombining these equations, we obtain the consumption Euler equation
(1+ τ(x(t))) · V
′(b(t))
∂U
∂c (c(t),g(t))
+(r(t)−δ ) =− λ˙ (t)
λ (t)
,
where λ˙ (t)/λ (t) can be expressed as a function of c(t), g(t), and x(t), and their time deriva-
tives using (A5). The Euler equation represents a demand for saving in part from intertemporal
consumption-smoothing considerations and in part from the utility provided by wealth. The equa-
tion implies that at the margin, the household is indifferent between spending income on consump-
tion and holding real wealth. The equation determines the level of aggregate demand. In steady
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state it defines the aggregate demand curve.
We have obtained the six equations that define the dynamical system representing the equilib-
rium. We now describe the transitional dynamics toward the steady state. The dynamic system is
simple to study because it can be described by one single endogenous variable: the costate variable
λ (t). All the variables can be recovered from λ (t). The law of motion for λ (t) is given by (A6):
λ˙ (t) = (δ − r) ·λ (t)−V ′(0)≡ φ(λ (t)).
Note that r(t) = r is constant over time (see (16) and note that g(t) is constant over time). The
steady-state value of the costate variable satisfies φ(λ ) = 0 so λ = V ′(0)/(δ − r)> 0. The nature
of the dynamical system is given by the sign of φ ′(λ ). Since φ ′(λ ) = δ − r > 0, we infer that the
system is a source. As there is no state variable, our source system jumps from one steady state to
the other in response to permanent, unexpected shocks.
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 6
Step 1. Using equation (15) and simple algebra, we write the marginal utility of consumption as
∂U
∂c
(c,g) = a ·d
(
G
C
) 1
ε
where
a≡ (1− γ) ·
(
1
c
) ε−1
ε
, d(θ)≡U (1,θ)
Additional algebra shows that the elasticity of d(θ) is 1/z(θ) where
z(θ)≡ 1+ 1− γ
γ
·
(
g
c
· 1
θ
) ε−1
ε
Step 2. Using the results from step 1 and equation (16), we rewrite the interest-rate schedule as
δ − r = (δ − r) ·
(
V ′(0)
V ′(0)
)1−α
·d
(
g
c
) 1−β
ε
·d
(
G
Y ∗−G
)− 1−βε
.
Using more results from step 1 and more algebra, we find that the elasticity of the interest-rate
schedule is
d ln(δ − r)
d ln(G)
=−1−β
ε
· 1
z(G/(Y ∗−G)) ·
Y ∗
Y ∗−G .
Note that δ − r does not depend on the market tightness.
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Step 3. We implicitly define the function C(G,x) as the solution of
d
(
G
C
)− 1ε
=
a
V ′(0)
· δ − r
1+ τ(x)
.
The function C(G,x) is the gross personal consumption that satisfies the Euler equation (18) for a
gross government consumption G and market tightness x. Using the results from steps 1 and 2 and
simple algebra, we obtain the two following elasticities:
∂ ln(C)
∂ ln(x)
=−ε ·η · τ · z
(
G
C
)
∂ ln(C)
∂ ln(G)
= 1− (1−β ) · Y
∗
Y ∗−G ·
z(G/C)
z(G/(Y ∗−G)) .
Step 4. The equilibrium condition determining market tightness is
Y =C(G,x)+G.
We differentiate this equilibrium condition with respect to G:
d ln(Y )
d ln(G)
=
C
Y
·
(
∂ ln(C)
∂ ln(G)
+
∂ ln(C)
∂ ln(x)
· d ln(x)
d ln(G)
)
+
G
Y
Using the elasticity of Y (x), we obtain
d ln(Y )
d ln(G)
= (1−η) ·u · d ln(x)
d ln(G)
.
Using these equations and the elasticities from step 3, we obtain[
1+
C
Y
· ε · η
1−η ·
τ
u
· z
(
G
C
)]
· d ln(Y )
d ln(G)
= 1− (1−β ) ·C
Y
· Y
∗
Y ∗−G ·
z(G/C)
z(G/(Y ∗−G))
d ln(Y )
d ln(G)
=
1− (1−β ) · 1−G/Y1−G/Y ∗ · z(G/(Y−G))z(G/(Y ∗−G))
1+ CY · ε · η1−η · τu · z
(G
C
) .
Step 5. When the unemployment rate is efficient, Y = Y ∗ and 1 = [η/(1−η)] · τ/u. Hence, the
expression for the multiplier simplifies to
d ln(Y )
d ln(G)
=
β
1+ ε · CY · z
(G
C
) .
In the average state, G/C = G/C so z(G/C) = 1/γ and the multiplier further simplifies to
d ln(Y )
d ln(G)
=
β
1+ εγ · CY
.
54
Table A1: Parameter Values Used in the Simulations
Description Value Source
Panel A. Average values targeted in calibration
u unemployment rate 5.9% CPS, 1951–2014
x market tightness 0.65 Barnichon [2010], JOLTS, and CPS,
1951–2014
G/Y government purchases-output ratio 16.6% CES, 1951–2014
τ matching wedge 7.8% efficiency on average (see Section 4)
dY/dG government-purchases multiplier 0.5 literature (see Section 4)
V ′(0) marginal utility of wealth 1 normalization
Panel B. Calibrated parameters
1−η tightness elasticity of job-finding rate 0.43 Barnichon [2010], JOLTS, and CPS,
1951–2014 (see Section 4)
s separation rate (monthly) 3.3% CPS, 1951–2014
ω matching efficacy 0.68 matches average values
ρ matching cost 1.77 matches average values
ε elasticity of substitution 1 Section 4
γ parameter of utility function 0.166 matches G/Y = 16.6%
c parameter of utility function 0.728 matches average values
g parameter of utility function 0.145 matches average values
α parameter of interest-rate schedule 1 normalization
β parameter of interest-rate schedule 0.5 matches dY/dG = 0.5
δ − r parameter of interest-rate schedule 0.941 matches average values
Next, if government purchases are chosen optimally, γ = G/Y and the multiplier simplifies to
dY
dG
= β · 1
γ+ ε · (1− γ) .
Finally, if ε = 1, then dY/dG = β .
Appendix F: Calibration of the Specific Model
In this appendix we calibrate the specific model of Section 6 to US data for the 1951–2014 period.
The calibration is summarized in Table A1.
We calibrate several parameters such that the values of key variables in the average state match
the average values of these variables in the data. We target an average unemployment rate of
u = 5.9%, an average market tightness of x = 0.65, an average government purchases-output ratio
of G/Y = 16.6%, and an average matching wedge of τ = 7.8%. We also normalize the values of
marginal utility of wealth in the average state to 1: V ′(0) = 1. (These average values come from
the times series constructed in Section 4 and Appendix B.)
We begin by calibrating the three parameters determining the value of the sufficient statistics at
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the heart of our formulas for optimal government purchases. Based on the discussion in Section 4,
we calibrate the model to obtain an elasticity of substitution between government and personal
consumptions of 1, a tightness elasticity of the job-finding rate of 0.57, and a multiplier in the
average state of 0.5. Hence we set ε = 1, η = 0.43, and β = 0.5.40
Next, we calibrate parameters related to matching. We set the separation rate to its average
value over the 1951–2014 period: s = 3.3% (see Appendix B). To calibrate the matching efficacy,
we exploit the relationship u · f (x) = s · (1− u), which implies ω = s · (x)η−1 · (1− u)/u = 0.68.
To calibrate the vacancy-filling cost, we exploit the relationship τ = ρ · s/ [ω · (x)−η −ρ · s], which
implies ρ = ω · (x)−η · τ/ [s · (1+ τ)] = 1.77.
Then, we calibrate the parameters of the utility function. The parameter γ determines the
optimal government purchases-output ratio in the average state. As we assume that the average
government purchases-output ratio is optimal in the average state, we set γ = 0.166. We set the
scaling parameters c and g to g = (1−u) ·G/Y ·= 0.145 and c = (1−G/Y ) · (1−u) = 0.728.
Last, we calibrate the parameters of the interest-rate schedule. For aggregate demand shocks
to generate fluctuations, we need α > 0. The value of α determines the elasticity of output to the
marginal utility of wealth, V ′(0). Since we do not know the amplitude of the fluctuations of V ′(0),
the exact value of α is irrelevant. We arbitrarily set α = 1. Last, using (17), we set δ − r = 0.941.
Appendix G: Robustness of Simulation Results
The simulation results in the text are obtained for an elasticity of substitution between government
and personal consumption of ε = 1 and a government-purchases multiplier in the average state of
dY/dG = 0.5. In this appendix we repeat the simulations for alternative values of ε and dY/dG.
Figure A5 displays simulations for ε = 0.5 and ε = 2. The figure shows that when ε is lower,
the optimal government purchases-output ratio responds less to fluctuations in unemployment,
and consequently, fluctuations in unemployment are less attenuated. For instance when ε = 0.5
and the unemployment rate reaches 9.6% for G/Y = 16.6%, it is optimal to increase government
purchases to G/Y = 18.9%, which reduces the unemployment rate to 8.0%. When ε = 2 and the
unemployment rate reaches 9.6% for G/Y = 16.6%, it is optimal to increase government purchases
to G/Y = 20.2%, which reduces the unemployment rate to 6.5%. The figure also shows that the
explicit formula, given by (12), is more accurate for lower values of ε .
Figure A6 displays simulations for dY/dG = 0.2 and dY/dG = 1. The figure shows that a
higher value of dY/dG does not imply that optimal government purchases respond more strongly
to a rise in unemployment. It does imply, however, that fluctuations in unemployment are more
attenuated. For instance when dY/dG = 0.2 and the unemployment rate reaches 9.6% for G/Y =
16.6%, it is optimal to increase government purchases to G/Y = 19.3%, which reduces the unem-
ployment rate to 8.6%. When dY/dG = 1 and the unemployment rate reaches 9.6% for G/Y =
16.6%, it is optimal to increase government purchases to G/Y = 18.5%, which reduces the un-
employment rate to 6.2%. The figure also shows that the explicit formula, given by (12), is more
accurate for lower values of dY/dG. This is not surprising since the explicit formula is obtained
by assuming that dY/dG is small enough.
40Proposition 6 establishes the link between β and the value of the multiplier.
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Figure A5: Simulations of the Specific Model for Various Elasticities of Substitution
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Figure A6: Simulations of the Specific Model for Various Multipliers
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